Re: x86 SHA1: Faster than OpenSSL

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Linus Torvalds wrote:
> 
> The bigger issue seems to be that it's shifter-limited, or that's what I 
> take away from my profiles. I suspect it's even _more_ shifter-limited on 
> some other micro-architectures, because gcc is being stupid, and generates
> 
> 	ror $31,%eax
> 
> from the "left shift + right shift" combination. It seems to -always- 
> generate a "ror", rather than trying to generate 'rot' if the shift count 
> would be smaller that way.
> 
> And I know _some_ old micro-architectures will literally internally loop 
> on the rol/ror counts, so "ror $31" can be _much_ more expensive than "rol 
> $1".
> 
> That isn't the case on my Nehalem, though. But I can't seem to get gcc to 
> generate better code without actually using inline asm..

The compiler does the right thing w/ something like this:

+#if __GNUC__>1 && defined(__i386)
+#define SHA_ROT(data,bits) ({ \
+  unsigned d = (data); \
+  if (bits<16) \
+    __asm__ ("roll %1,%0" : "=r" (d) : "I" (bits), "0" (d)); \
+  else \
+    __asm__ ("rorl %1,%0" : "=r" (d) : "I" (32-bits), "0" (d)); \
+  d; \
+  })
+#else
 #define SHA_ROT(X,n) (((X) << (n)) | ((X) >> (32-(n))))
+#endif
 
which doesn't obfuscate the code as much.
(I needed the asm on p4 anyway, as w/o it the mozilla version is even
 slower than an rfc3174 one. rol vs ror makes no measurable difference)

>  static void blk_SHA1Block(blk_SHA_CTX *ctx, const unsigned int *data)
>  {
> @@ -93,7 +105,7 @@ static void blk_SHA1Block(blk_SHA_CTX *ctx, const unsigned int *data)
>  
>  	/* Unroll it? */
>  	for (t = 16; t <= 79; t++)
> -		W[t] = SHA_ROT(W[t-3] ^ W[t-8] ^ W[t-14] ^ W[t-16], 1);
> +		W[t] = SHA_ROL(W[t-3] ^ W[t-8] ^ W[t-14] ^ W[t-16], 1);

unrolling this once (but not more) is a win, at least on p4.

>  #define T_0_19(t) \
> -	TEMP = SHA_ROT(A,5) + (((C^D)&B)^D)     + E + W[t] + 0x5a827999; \
> -	E = D; D = C; C = SHA_ROT(B, 30); B = A; A = TEMP;
> +	TEMP = SHA_ROL(A,5) + (((C^D)&B)^D)     + E + W[t] + 0x5a827999; \
> +	E = D; D = C; C = SHA_ROR(B, 2); B = A; A = TEMP;
>  
>  	T_0_19( 0); T_0_19( 1); T_0_19( 2); T_0_19( 3); T_0_19( 4);
>  	T_0_19( 5); T_0_19( 6); T_0_19( 7); T_0_19( 8); T_0_19( 9);

unrolling these otoh is a clear loss (iirc ~10%). 

artur
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