Re: GPG signing for git commit?

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On Thu, Apr 16, 2009 at 4:55 AM, Robin H. Johnson <robbat2@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> One of the spots that we're looking for in this, is a model something
> like what follows. Firstly, a "proxy maintainer" (PM) is a developer
> with commit rights to the central repo, that's willing to proxy commits
> by an outside source for some specific package. Think of them as the
> kernel subsystem maintainer, but many more of them. The PM is still
> expected to verify the work before passing it on the central repo.
>
> So we have a commit with author+committer being the outside source, and
> now we want to record (in an easily reviewable fashion) that a specific
> changeset was introduced to the central tree by the PM.
>
> Not sure of the best route to trace this data. Signing the SHA1 makes
> the most sense, but need to be able to do that without polluting the tag
> namespace.
>
> If the changeset does not have an associated signature, we'd like to
> reject it at the central repo.

How about signing the tree SHA-1 and putting the signature in commit
message? It's like gpg way of saying Signed-off-by. If the committer
wants to sign again before pushing out, he could amend the commit,
append his signature there; or make a no-change commit to contain his
signature (probably from git-commit-tree because iirc git-commit won't
let you make no-change commit)
-- 
Duy
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