Once upon a time, Chris Adams <cmadams@xxxxxxxxxx> said: > What mechanism is there to keep track of these policies? There should > be a Fedora policy to control RPMs adding new policies to PolicyKit. As > a system admin, I look for setuid/setgid binaries and open sockets, but > now there's a new method to bypass that for root-level access. As a follow-up, I see on F10 that a user can also increase their process priority level (which is normally a privilege reserved for root). This is often useful in timing attacks and should not be allowed. If I'm reading the policy right, users can change PackageKit proxy settings and force a refresh of metadata. How much has PackageKit's (and yum's) code been audited for security? If I can point it at a proxy and force it to download data, how secure is it against attack (e.g. via corrupted data)? -- Chris Adams <cmadams@xxxxxxxxxx> Systems and Network Administrator - HiWAAY Internet Services I don't speak for anybody but myself - that's enough trouble. -- fedora-test-list mailing list fedora-test-list@xxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe: https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-test-list
