On Wed, 2011-05-18 at 19:14 +0200, J B wrote: > Hi, > > > I don't know if anyone > > would want to go as far as making DoS vulns release blocking, but speak > > up if you would! (Of course there is again the local/remote distinction > > to consider there: 'all DoS vulns' would be a much tighter standard than > > 'remote DoS vulns'). > > I think the "use of a live image shipped with the release" scenario is > worth rethinking due to the following: > > you talk about a *local* DoS - that's technically true. > But you know it can be triggered remotely e.g. if you are exposed to > Internet (nowadays almost everybody is), and the attacker knows the nature > of vulnerability, and what OS area can be hit to do the maximum damage > (the price can be very attractive - e.g. the issue raised today by me regarding > /run/user and /dev/shm and systemd, which is perhaps the most important > system program after kernel itself). > So, even a local DoS could qualify for a security blocker. Um, to my understanding, your reasoning is flawed. The definition of a 'local' vulnerability is one which requires console access to exploit. What you're talking about would not be possible with a 'local exploit', as the term is usually understood; these can't be exploited by a remote attacker even if you're 'exposed to Internet'. As far as I'm aware, the /dev/shm DoS cannot be exploited by a remote attacker. -- Adam Williamson Fedora QA Community Monkey IRC: adamw | Fedora Talk: adamwill AT fedoraproject DOT org http://www.happyassassin.net -- test mailing list test@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe: https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/test
