On Wed, 2013-01-30 at 08:33 -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > On 01/30/2013 02:13 AM, Andrew Jones wrote: > > On Wed, 2013-01-30 at 01:14 +0100, Andrew Jones wrote: > >> On Tue, 2013-01-29 at 10:07 -0500, m.roth@xxxxxxxxx wrote: > >>> Andrew Jones wrote: > >>>> (Apologies in advance for the length of this mail. I am a total noob > >>>> at SELinux so my vocabulary is probably not correct. Hopefully you > >>>> will be able to understand from context what I am trying to say.) > >>>> > >>>> I have been setting up x11vnc on some of my machines. It looks like > >>>> there are a hundred different ways of setting it up but I have chosen > >>>> to follow the spirit of this entry in the Fedora Forum: > >>>> > >>>> http://forums.fedoraforum.org/showpost.php?p=1448696&postcount=2 > >>>> > >>>> This works with SELinux permissive but fails completely when > >>>> enforcing. > >>>> > >>>> Even when running permissively there are so many SELinux events in > >>>> the first few seconds that many are dropped as shown here: > >>>> > >>>> Jan 29 03:44:10 ecafe audispd: queue is full - dropping event > >>>> > >>>> After several hours of scouring the system log, running sealert and > >>>> creating policies, rinsing and repeating I think I have generated > >>>> the command line that will identify all the events which occur during > >>>> an x11vnc session: > >>>> > >>>> egrep ps\|x11vnc\|tcpd\|mission-control /var/log/audit/audit.log | > >>>> audit2allow -M mypol > >>>> > >>>> By repetitively running that line, applying the generated policy > >>>> then restarting the computer and launching a new vnc session > >>>> eventually all the events are able to be recorded without filling the > >>>> queue. > >>>> > >>> Andrew, > >>> > >>> First of all, how did you install x11vnc? Did you use yum, or is this > >>> from a tarball. You should ALWAYS prefer yum install, since this will > >>> get all dependencies, and install policy as part of the package. > >> > >> Installed from yum. Having read the x11vnc man page I got the impression > >> it's a bit of a swiss army knife and I had *assumed* that as it was so > >> hard to predict how it would be used it would not make sense to enforce > >> any particular policy. Is there a way of extracting and examining the > >> policies in an rpm? > >> > >>> > >>> Secondly, you should be looking at what it wants to do. For example, > >>> the fact that mcelog is in there worries me, a *lot*, since mcelog > >>> records ->hardware errors<-, meaning that you could be having hardware > >>> issues. > >>> > >> It is necessary for x11vnc to discover the name of an X11 authorization > >> file and the trick to do so is to do a `ps wwwaux | grep '/X.*-auth'` , > >> followed by a bit more grep and sed trickery to isolate the name of the > >> file that appears on the command line that launched xorg. > >> > >> The command above has this for output... root 26003 0.4 1.1 24184 > >> 12120 tty9 Ss+ 12:34 2:46 /usr/bin/Xorg :0 -br -verbose -logverbose > >> 7 -auth /var/run/gdm/auth-for-gdm-xpIgEt/database -nolisten tcp > >> > >> ... and the sed and grep trickery isolates the string > >> '/var/run/gdm/auth-for-gdm-xpIgEt/database' which is a required parameter > >> for x11vnc > >> > >> It did seem that many, many of the AVCs were caused by ps trying to get > >> attributes of or open directories in /proc. > >> > >> Why have I told you all this? > >> > >> grep type=AVC audit.log.1 | grep mcelog | grep -v comm=\"ps\" has no > >> output grep type=AVC audit.log.1 | grep mcelog has 21 lines of output > >> > >> So all the AVCs which mention mcelog include comm="ps" Here is a typical > >> sequence type=AVC msg=audit(1359035800.677:1209): avc: denied { getattr > >> } for pid=2248 comm="ps" path="/proc/539" dev="proc" ino=14875 > >> scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > >> tcontext=system_u:system_r:mcelog_t:s0 tclass=dir > >> > >> type=AVC msg=audit(1359035800.677:1210): avc: denied { search } for > >> pid=2248 comm="ps" name="539" dev="proc" ino=14875 > >> scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > >> tcontext=system_u:system_r:mcelog_t:s0 tclass=dir > >> > >> type=AVC msg=audit(1359035800.677:1210): avc: denied { read } for > >> pid=2248 comm="ps" name="stat" dev="proc" ino=14058 > >> scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > >> tcontext=system_u:system_r:mcelog_t:s0 tclass=file > >> > >> type=AVC msg=audit(1359035800.677:1210): avc: denied { open } for > >> pid=2248 comm="ps" path="/proc/539/stat" dev="proc" ino=14058 > >> scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > >> tcontext=system_u:system_r:mcelog_t:s0 tclass=file > >> > >> There were just 3 /proc directories that prompted this sequence of AVCs > >> containing mcelog and these were 539 (shown above), 517 and 509, but > >> having rebooted since I don't now know what processes they correspond to > >> and I suspect many other AVCs may have been omitted due to queue > >> overflow. Audit.log currently contains 900 lines of AVCs related to ps > >> accessing the /proc directory > > > > Having checked the timestamps in the system log I see that each set of AVCs > > occurred just once between re-boots (I rebooted after every launch of vnc / > > generation of new policies) so they could all be referring to the same > > process. > > > > I also noted that on my Fedora 18 machines mcelog is running as a daemon: $ > > ps -A www | grep mcelog 528 ? Ss 0:00 /usr/sbin/mcelog > > --ignorenodev --daemon --foreground > > > > mcelog is not running as a daemon on my Fedora 16 machine ... So I could be > > easily persuaded that the AVCs which mention mcelog refer to the attempts > > of ps to access the mcelog process. > > > >> > >> I tried to replicate the generation of AVCs by running ps from a command > >> prompt but nothing happened. Could ps be running from the wrong context? > >> Can you tell I hadn't a clue what I was talking about when I asked that > >> question?? > >> > >> > >>> Third, read the man page for audit2allow. It tells you how to convert > >>> from text policy to compiled and install it. It's not complicated. > >> Thanks for that. > >> > >>> > >>> Fourth, the "dropped" indicates that there are so many errors the > >>> queue can't keep up. From an old closed bug, one note for this problem > >>> is: -b 8192 in auditd.conf priority_boost = 4 in auditd.conf > >>> priority_boost = 8 in audispd.conf q_depth = 2048 in audispd.conf > >> > >> Thanks also for that. > >>> > >>> mark > >>> > >> Andy > >> > >> -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > >> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux > > > > > > -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux > > > Lets try this. > > chcon -t xserver_exec_t /usr/bin/x11vnc > > And create myvnc.te that looks like the following: > > cat myvnc.te > #========================================================================== > policy_module(myvnc,1.0) > > gen_require(` > type xserver_exec_t, xserver_t; > ') > > tcpd_wrapped_domain(xserver_t, xserver_exec_t) > #======================================================================= > > make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile myvnc.pp > semodule -i myvpnc.pp > > Then try it again. > > The reason you are getting all the AVC's about random domains is the x11vnc is > doing the equivalent of the ps command, it it is walking through /proc and > looking at every process. The SELinux interface to handle this would have been: > > domain_read_all_domains_state(tcpd_t) > > But what we really want is tcpd_t to transition to xserver_t when running x11vnc. > > > Thank you for that - the difference was phenomenal! At first it didn't seem to do anything because it was a bash script, not x11vnc, that was running ps. However, I read the x11vnc manual again and finally realized how to make it run ps for me. Once I had made the change the AVCs reduced from several hundred to a large handful. (Removing your myvnc.pol policy returned it to producing hundreds of AVCs again) So I ran sealert and audit2allow again and produced two more policies. Would it be possible to optimize them further knowing what they are trying to do, or at least combine the policy for x11vnc into the existing myvncpol? (I still haven't worked out the syntax of these things so I can't do it myself yet) The policies created were as follows: # grep \"x11vnc\" /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M myx11vncpol Gave: module myx11vncpol 1.0; require { type tcpd_t; type var_log_t; type passwd_file_t; type shell_exec_t; type admin_home_t; type tmpfs_t; type xserver_exec_t; class dir search; class shm { write unix_read unix_write read destroy create }; class file { write getattr read open execute execute_no_trans }; } #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t admin_home_t:dir search; allow tcpd_t admin_home_t:file { read getattr open }; allow tcpd_t passwd_file_t:file { read getattr open }; allow tcpd_t self:shm { write unix_read unix_write read destroy create }; allow tcpd_t shell_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans }; allow tcpd_t tmpfs_t:file { read write }; #!!!! The source type 'tcpd_t' can write to a 'file' of the following type: # tcpd_tmp_t allow tcpd_t var_log_t:file { write open }; #!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy allow tcpd_t xserver_exec_t:file execute; @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ (x11vnc_sh is the bash file that calls x11vnc) # grep x11vnc_sh /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M myx11vnc_shpol Gave: module myx11vnc_shpol 1.0; require { type tcpd_t; type bin_t; type passwd_file_t; type proc_t; type xdm_var_run_t; type xserver_exec_t; class dir search; class file { execute read open getattr execute_no_trans }; } #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t bin_t:file { execute execute_no_trans }; allow tcpd_t passwd_file_t:file { read getattr open }; allow tcpd_t proc_t:file { read getattr open }; allow tcpd_t xdm_var_run_t:dir search; allow tcpd_t xdm_var_run_t:file read; allow tcpd_t xserver_exec_t:file execute_no_trans; #!!!! This avc is allowed in the current policy allow tcpd_t xserver_exec_t:file { read execute open }; In case it helps I will include the sealert messages below. If it doesn't help there is no need to continue reading x11vnc SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/x11vnc from getattr access on the file /etc/passwd. ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that x11vnc should be allowed getattr access on the passwd file by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep x11vnc /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Target Context system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0 Target Objects /etc/passwd [ file ] Source x11vnc Source Path /usr/bin/x11vnc Port <Unknown> Host ecafe.hogwarts.local Source RPM Packages bash-4.2.42-1.fc18.i686 Target RPM Packages setup-2.8.57-1.fc18.noarch Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.11.1-73.fc18.noarch Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Permissive Host Name ecafe.hogwarts.local Platform Linux ecafe.hogwarts.local 3.7.4-204.fc18.i686.PAE #1 SMP Wed Jan 23 16:58:41 UTC 2013 i686 i686 Alert Count 9 First Seen 2013-01-30 18:37:03 CET Last Seen 2013-01-31 00:12:40 CET Local ID 9b00da1e-2a33-4110-a6da-b4330452daf5 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.172:432): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=2320 comm="x11vnc_sh" path="/etc/passwd" dev="sda5" ino=1314967 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1359587560.172:432): arch=i386 syscall=fstat64 success=yes exit=0 a0=3 a1=bfe91060 a2=42896000 a3=82aa728 items=0 ppid=724 pid=2320 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 ses=4294967295 tty=(none) comm=x11vnc_sh exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: x11vnc,tcpd_t,passwd_file_t,file,getattr audit2allow #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t passwd_file_t:file getattr; audit2allow -R #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t passwd_file_t:file getattr; @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/x11vnc from read access on the file /etc/passwd. ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that x11vnc should be allowed read access on the passwd file by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep x11vnc /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Target Context system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0 Target Objects /etc/passwd [ file ] Source x11vnc Source Path /usr/bin/x11vnc Port <Unknown> Host ecafe.hogwarts.local Source RPM Packages bash-4.2.42-1.fc18.i686 Target RPM Packages setup-2.8.57-1.fc18.noarch Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.11.1-73.fc18.noarch Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Permissive Host Name ecafe.hogwarts.local Platform Linux ecafe.hogwarts.local 3.7.4-204.fc18.i686.PAE #1 SMP Wed Jan 23 16:58:41 UTC 2013 i686 i686 Alert Count 9 First Seen 2013-01-30 18:37:03 CET Last Seen 2013-01-31 00:12:40 CET Local ID 48950c77-d55b-4222-9021-f93116a68a66 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.170:431): avc: denied { read } for pid=2320 comm="x11vnc_sh" name="passwd" dev="sda5" ino=1314967 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.170:431): avc: denied { open } for pid=2320 comm="x11vnc_sh" path="/etc/passwd" dev="sda5" ino=1314967 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1359587560.170:431): arch=i386 syscall=open success=yes exit=ESRCH a0=b7554ef5 a1=80000 a2=1b6 a3=82aa728 items=0 ppid=724 pid=2320 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 ses=4294967295 tty=(none) comm=x11vnc_sh exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: x11vnc,tcpd_t,passwd_file_t,file,read audit2allow #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t passwd_file_t:file { read open }; audit2allow -R #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t passwd_file_t:file { read open }; @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ x11vnc_sh SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/bash from read access on the file meminfo. ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that bash should be allowed read access on the meminfo file by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep x11vnc_sh /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Target Context system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 Target Objects meminfo [ file ] Source x11vnc_sh Source Path /usr/bin/bash Port <Unknown> Host ecafe.hogwarts.local Source RPM Packages bash-4.2.42-1.fc18.i686 Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.11.1-73.fc18.noarch Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Permissive Host Name ecafe.hogwarts.local Platform Linux ecafe.hogwarts.local 3.7.4-204.fc18.i686.PAE #1 SMP Wed Jan 23 16:58:41 UTC 2013 i686 i686 Alert Count 3 First Seen 2013-01-30 18:50:12 CET Last Seen 2013-01-31 00:12:40 CET Local ID fc347cac-8bf1-47a6-a192-f46949682732 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.136:429): avc: denied { read } for pid=2320 comm="x11vnc_sh" name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532026 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.136:429): avc: denied { open } for pid=2320 comm="x11vnc_sh" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532026 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1359587560.136:429): arch=i386 syscall=open success=yes exit=ESRCH a0=4285661e a1=80000 a2=1b6 a3=82a8a68 items=0 ppid=724 pid=2320 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 ses=4294967295 tty=(none) comm=x11vnc_sh exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: x11vnc_sh,tcpd_t,proc_t,file,read audit2allow #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t proc_t:file { read open }; audit2allow -R #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t proc_t:file { read open }; @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/bash from execute access on the file /usr/local/bin/x11vnc_sh. ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that bash should be allowed execute access on the x11vnc_sh file by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep x11vnc_sh /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Target Context unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 Target Objects /usr/local/bin/x11vnc_sh [ file ] Source x11vnc_sh Source Path /usr/bin/bash Port <Unknown> Host ecafe.hogwarts.local Source RPM Packages bash-4.2.42-1.fc18.i686 Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.11.1-73.fc18.noarch Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Permissive Host Name ecafe.hogwarts.local Platform Linux ecafe.hogwarts.local 3.7.4-204.fc18.i686.PAE #1 SMP Wed Jan 23 16:58:41 UTC 2013 i686 i686 Alert Count 3 First Seen 2013-01-30 18:50:12 CET Last Seen 2013-01-31 00:12:40 CET Local ID f7cdf02d-2812-43cf-8a63-b3b389fd825a Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.130:428): avc: denied { execute } for pid=2320 comm="tcpd" name="x11vnc_sh" dev="sda5" ino=2110225 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.130:428): avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for pid=2320 comm="tcpd" path="/usr/local/bin/x11vnc_sh" dev="sda5" ino=2110225 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.130:428): avc: denied { execute } for pid=2320 comm="tcpd" name="bash" dev="sda5" ino=2123061 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t:s0 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1359587560.130:428): arch=i386 syscall=execve success=yes exit=0 a0=bf9783ec a1=bf97a4a4 a2=bf97a4ac a3=bf9780b0 items=0 ppid=724 pid=2320 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 ses=4294967295 tty=(none) comm=x11vnc_sh exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: x11vnc_sh,tcpd_t,bin_t,file,execute audit2allow #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t bin_t:file { execute execute_no_trans }; allow tcpd_t shell_exec_t:file execute; audit2allow -R #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t bin_t:file { execute execute_no_trans }; allow tcpd_t shell_exec_t:file execute; @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/bash from getattr access on the file /proc/meminfo. ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that bash should be allowed getattr access on the meminfo file by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep x11vnc_sh /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Target Context system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 Target Objects /proc/meminfo [ file ] Source x11vnc_sh Source Path /usr/bin/bash Port <Unknown> Host ecafe.hogwarts.local Source RPM Packages bash-4.2.42-1.fc18.i686 Target RPM Packages Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.11.1-73.fc18.noarch Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Permissive Host Name ecafe.hogwarts.local Platform Linux ecafe.hogwarts.local 3.7.4-204.fc18.i686.PAE #1 SMP Wed Jan 23 16:58:41 UTC 2013 i686 i686 Alert Count 3 First Seen 2013-01-30 18:50:12 CET Last Seen 2013-01-31 00:12:40 CET Local ID db259bd3-49de-4e22-837d-efc6a403b604 Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1359587560.143:430): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=2320 comm="x11vnc_sh" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532026 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1359587560.143:430): arch=i386 syscall=fstat64 success=yes exit=0 a0=3 a1=bfe8f0d0 a2=42896000 a3=82a8a68 items=0 ppid=724 pid=2320 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 ses=4294967295 tty=(none) comm=x11vnc_sh exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: x11vnc_sh,tcpd_t,proc_t,file,getattr audit2allow #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t proc_t:file getattr; audit2allow -R #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t proc_t:file getattr; @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ SELinux is preventing /usr/bin/bash from execute access on the file /usr/bin/bash. ***** Plugin catchall (100. confidence) suggests *************************** If you believe that bash should be allowed execute access on the bash file by default. Then you should report this as a bug. You can generate a local policy module to allow this access. Do allow this access for now by executing: # grep x11vnc_sh /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp Additional Information: Source Context system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Target Context system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t:s0 Target Objects /usr/bin/bash [ file ] Source x11vnc_sh Source Path /usr/bin/bash Port <Unknown> Host ecafe.hogwarts.local Source RPM Packages bash-4.2.42-1.fc18.i686 Target RPM Packages bash-4.2.42-1.fc18.i686 Policy RPM selinux-policy-3.11.1-73.fc18.noarch Selinux Enabled True Policy Type targeted Enforcing Mode Permissive Host Name ecafe.hogwarts.local Platform Linux ecafe.hogwarts.local 3.7.4-204.fc18.i686.PAE #1 SMP Wed Jan 23 16:58:41 UTC 2013 i686 i686 Alert Count 1 First Seen 2013-01-31 00:11:10 CET Last Seen 2013-01-31 00:11:10 CET Local ID a1ab3c5f-f530-4432-b696-25745895a33e Raw Audit Messages type=AVC msg=audit(1359587470.242:384): avc: denied { execute } for pid=1739 comm="tcpd" name="bash" dev="sda5" ino=2123061 scontext=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t:s0 tclass=file type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1359587470.242:384): arch=i386 syscall=execve success=yes exit=0 a0=bf9b3bfc a1=bf9b5cb4 a2=bf9b5cbc a3=bf9b38c0 items=0 ppid=724 pid=1739 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 ses=4294967295 tty=(none) comm=x11vnc_sh exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=system_u:system_r:tcpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Hash: x11vnc_sh,tcpd_t,shell_exec_t,file,execute audit2allow #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t shell_exec_t:file execute; audit2allow -R #============= tcpd_t ============== allow tcpd_t shell_exec_t:file execute; -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
