Re: Removing unconfined type

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On 01/15/2013 06:07 PM, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar (anmajumd) wrote:
> Hi Dan,
> 
> We have removed the unconfined_u user type .We do not see it when we do a 
> semanage user -l
> 
> [root@vos-cm148 home]# semanage user -l
> 
> Labeling   MLS/       MLS/ SELinux User    Prefix     MCS Level  MCS Range 
> SELinux Roles
> 
> admin_u         user       s0         s0-s0:c0.c1023 sysadm_r system_r 
> git_shell_u     user       s0         s0 git_shell_r guest_u         user
> s0         s0 guest_r root            user       s0         s0-s0:c0.c1023 
> sysadm_r system_r specialuser_u   user       s0         s0 sysadm_r
> system_r staff_u         user       s0         s0-s0:c0.c1023 staff_r
> sysadm_r system_r unconfined_r sysadm_u        user       s0
> s0-s0:c0.c1023 sysadm_r system_u        user       s0
> s0-s0:c0.c1023 system_r unconfined_r user_u          user       s0
> s0                             user_r xguest_u        user       s0
> s0 xguest_r
> 
> 
> 
> But some file security contexts still have unconfined_u
> 
> drwxr-xr-x. root       root          system_u:object_r:home_root_t:s0 . 
> dr-xr-xr-x. root       root          system_u:object_r:root_t:s0      .. 
> drwx------. admin      administrator user_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 
> admin drwxr-x---. ccmservice ccmbase 
> unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 ccmservice drwx------. drfkeys
> drfkeys unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 drfkeys drwxr-x---.
> drfuser    platform unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 drfuser 
> drwxr-xr-x. informix   informix      system_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 
> informix drwx------. pwrecovery platform 
> unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 pwrecovery drwxr-x---. sftpuser
> sftpuser unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 sftpuser drwxr-x---.
> tomcat     tomcat        unconfined_u:object_r:tomcat_t:s0 tomcat
> 
> 
> What would be the reason for that?
> 
> 
> Thanks, Anamitra
> 
> On 1/15/13 9:22 AM, "Daniel J Walsh" <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On 01/15/2013 12:19 PM, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar (anmajumd) wrote:
>>>> Hi Dan,
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks for the prompt response.
>>>> 
>>>> The reason I brought this thread alive is because I see a lot of 
>>>> denials after removing the unconfined type and doing a fixfiles &&
>>>> reboot and as you indicated They are many resources that have
>>>> acquired unlabeled_t and hence we see a lot of denials. So based on
>>>> this I would like to ask when exactly should we have the reboot after
>>>> executing fixfiles. Should the reboot be immediate after we have
>>>> removed the unconfined type or can it wait for a later time.
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks, Anamitra
>>>> 
>>>> On 1/15/13 9:08 AM, "Daniel J Walsh" <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> On 01/15/2013 11:48 AM, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar (anmajumd) wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi Dominick,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Can you help me understand why step 5 is needed.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Thanks, Anamitra
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 10/30/12 1:03 PM, "Dominick Grift"
>>>>>>> <dominick.grift@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Tue, 2012-10-30 at 19:45 +0000, Anamitra Dutta Majumdar 
>>>>>>>> (anmajumd) wrote:
>>>>>>>>> We are on RHEL6 and we need to remove the unconfined type
>>>>>>>>> from our targeted Selinux policies so that no process runs
>>>>>>>>> in the unconfined domain.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> In order to achieve that we have removed the unconfined
>>>>>>>>> module .Is there anything Else we need to do.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Thanks, Anamitra
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> You can also disable the unconfineduser module to make it
>>>>>>>> even more strict
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> but if you do make sure that no users are mapped to
>>>>>>>> unconfined_u and relabel the file system because selinux will
>>>>>>>> change contexts that have unconfined_u in them to unlabeled_t
>>>>>>>> is unconfined_u no longer exists
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> so in theory:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 1. setenforce 0 2. change you logging mappings to exclude 
>>>>>>>> unconfined_u 3. purge /tmp and /var/tmp 4. semodule
>>>>>>>> unconfineduser 5. fixfiles onboot && reboot
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I think that should take care of it
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Not though that even then there will be some unconfined
>>>>>>>> domains left
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> There is no way to get them out without manually editing and 
>>>>>>>> rebuilding the policy
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> But if you disabled the unconfined and unconfineduser modules
>>>>>>>> then you are running  pretty strict
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>>>>>>>>> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>>>>>>>> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
>>>>>>> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
>>>>>>> 
>>>> If you have any files that are owned by unconfined_u they will
>>>> become unlabeled_t and not able to be used by confined domains, which
>>>> is why the relabel is required.
>>>> 
> 
> If you have any processes running on your system that are unconfined_t 
> then they will become unlabled_t and start generating AVC's.  Any confined
> apps that are trying to read unlabeled_u files will start to fail also.
> 
> It is probably best to do this at Single User mode/permissive and then 
> cleanup the disk.
> 
> -- selinux mailing list selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/selinux
> 

Because you have not relabeled them.

restorecon -R -F -v .

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