On Mon, 2011-08-29 at 10:36 -0400, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On 08/29/11 11:10, Miroslav Grepl wrote:
> > On 08/29/2011 12:52 PM, Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> >> On 08/29/11 08:33, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >>> On Fri, 2011-08-26 at 20:51 +0200, Miroslav Grepl wrote:
> >>>> Together with Dan Walsh, Jan Chadima we made some changes in the
> >>>> openssh
> >>>> package.
> >>>>
> >>>> But we have the following issue with the following code
> >>>>
> >>>> ...
> >>>>
> >>>> if (internal-sftp)
> >>>> setuid()
> >>>> getexecon(&scon)
> >>>> setcon(scon)
> >>>> freecon(scon)
> >>>>
> >>>> ...
> >>>>
> >>>> We have
> >>>>
> >>>> allow sshd_t unpriv_userdomain:process dyntransition
> >>>>
> >>>> rule but we get a constraint violation with the following AVC msg
> >>>>
> >>>> type=AVC msg=audit(1314348650.561:7910): avc: denied {
> >>>> dyntransition }
> >>>> for
> >>>> pid=555 comm="sshd"
> >>>> scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
> >>>> tcontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0
> >>>>
> >>>> because of
> >>>>
> >>>> constrain process dyntransition
> >>>> (
> >>>> u1 == u2 and r1 == r2
> >>>> )
> >>>>
> >>>> My question is why dyntrans is not allowed to change USER or ROLE.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=729648
> >>> I think just because we haven't previously had a system program using
> >>> setcon(3) to switch its user/role.
> >> Also because the theory we would be reproducing privilege bracketed
> >> domains, so you'd be going to a different privilege in eg httpd_t ->
> >> httpd_mycgi_t, and that would not require user or role changes.
> >>
> > Ok, I understand. Thanks.
> >
> > Could we add an attribute to break this?
>
> Yes, we could add one. The question is if we want the same attribute as
> the regular transition or a new one. i.e. I'm thinking
>
> constran process dyntranstion
> (
> u1 == u2
> or ( t1 == can_change_process_identity and t2 == process_user_target )
> );
>
> constran process dyntranstion
> (
> r1 == r2
> or ( t1 == can_change_process_identity and t2 == process_user_target )
> );
>
> do we want can_change_process_identity attribute or a new one?
If so, then might as well just coalesce into the existing constraint on
transition permission.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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