On Tue, 2011-05-31 at 11:17 -0400, Maria Iano wrote:
> Is there some way to prevent auditd from logging these AVC messages?
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1306183684.644:121931): avc: denied { connectto }
> for pid=31266 comm="vsftpd" path="/var/lib/likewise/.lsassd"
> scontext=system_u:system_r:ftpd_t:s0
> tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1306185430.740:122001): avc: denied { write }
> for pid=378 comm="pickup" name=".lsassd" dev=dm-1 ino=426071
> scontext=system_u:system_r:postfix_pickup_t:s0
> tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t:s0 tclass=sock_file
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1306179615.139:121656): avc: denied { connectto }
> for pid=22431 comm="httpd" path="/var/lib/likewise/.lsassd"
> scontext=user_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
> tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
>
> type=USER_AUTH msg=audit(1306265986.269:124088): user pid=25822 uid=0
> auid=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
> msg='PAM: authentication acct="layout" : exe="/usr/sbin/
> sshd" (hostname=asb-sys61.us.ad.gannett.com, addr=10.0.65.242,
> terminal=ssh res=failed)'
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1306853338.309:51215): avc: denied { write } for
> pid=5472 comm="genhomedircon" name=".lsassd" dev=dm-4 ino=32827
> scontext=user_u:system_r:semanage_t:s0
> tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t:s0 tclass=sock_file
>
> type=AVC msg=audit(1306853338.309:51215): avc: denied { connectto }
> for pid=5472 comm="genhomedircon" path="/var/lib/likewise/.lsassd"
> scontext=user_u:system_r:semanage_t:s0
> tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
I am not sure whether "el5" supports it but i guess you could try piping
the avc denials into "audit2allow -DM mydontauditsforlikewise"
And then load it into the system with "semodule -i
mydontauditsforlikewise.pp"
If that does not work you could write a policy module manually:
mkdir mylw; cd mylw; echo "policy_module(mylw, 1.0.0) gen_require(\`
type semanage_t, initrc_t, var_lib_t, ftpd_t, httpd_t, postfix_pickup_t;
') dontaudit { httpd_t ftpd_t semanage_t postfix_pickup_t }
initrc_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; dontaudit { httpd_t ftpd_t
semanage_t, postfix_pickup_t } var_lib_t:sock_file
write_sock_file_perms;" >> mylw.te
(yum install selinux-policy-devel)
make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile mylw.pp
sudo semodule -i mylw.pp
Although hidding these may have consequences for example attempts by
httpd, ftpd etc to connect to any service with a unix stream socket
running in the init script domain will be hidden.
Same for any of those domain trying to write to var_lib_t sock files.
> Thanks,
> Maria
>
>
>
>
> --
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> selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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