On Thu, 2009-12-31 at 11:06 +0100, Grzegorz Nosek wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I have a problem trying to run sshd via xinetd on a CentOS 5.4 system
> (I want to slap a tcpwrappers-style wrapper before sshd, so I need it
> that way).
>
> In permissive mode I can log in/out with the following failures reported
> by audit2allow:
>
> allow amanda_t consoletype_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans };
> allow amanda_t devpts_t:chr_file { write ioctl };
> allow amanda_t hostname_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans };
> allow amanda_t shell_exec_t:file entrypoint;
>
> I don't even have amanda installed, so the context is clearly bogus.
>
> After a chat on #fedora-selinux it seems that sshd cannot find its
> default context, so falls back to the first available one, which happens
> to be something:something:amanda_t (the list is read from /selinux/user).
> This operation is performed by sshd itself (as verified by strace).
>
> I don't need Fort Knox type security but I'd like to use SELinux to
> tighten down other parts of the system, so I'd really like to use the
> enforcing mode.
>
> Any hints? A good TFM to R will hopefully do.
In what label/context are xinetd and sshd running (ps -eZ)?
What are the file security contexts on their executables (ls -Z)?
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
--
fedora-selinux-list mailing list
fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
