On Mon, Aug 17, 2009 at 10:46:16PM +0200, Daniel Fazekas wrote:
> On Aug 17, 2009, at 18:09, Dominick Grift wrote:
>
>> So that means there is no such shared policy. we can can work around
>> that by adding the following to the myracoon.te:
>> echo "require { type setkey_exec_t, setkey_t; }" >> myracoon.te;
>> echo "domtrans_pattern(racoon_t, setkey_exec_t, setkey_t)" >>
>> myracoon.te;
>>
>> assuming setkey_t is the domain type
>
> That did compile, but now there's a whole new set of setkey_t denials.
>
> allow setkey_t racoon_t:key_socket { read write };
> allow setkey_t racoon_t:netlink_route_socket { read write };
> allow setkey_t racoon_t:udp_socket { read write };
> allow setkey_t racoon_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
> allow setkey_t racoon_tmp_t:file { read getattr };
I was kind of expecting that.
The issue is that most of these rules look really ugly.
Maybe there is a 'good' reason why setkey_domtrans is not available.
Maybe we should not let racoon_t domain transition to setkey_t.
try this rule instead of the domtrans_pattern():
can_exec(racoon_t, setkey_exec_t)
(maybe theres a setkey_exec() available for you to call)
This will cause racoon_t to run setkey in the racoon_t domain instead.
>
> I now had to make setkey_t permissive. Previously it only required doing
> that for racoon_t.
>
> --
> fedora-selinux-list mailing list
> fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
Attachment:
pgpuclFFEESlW.pgp
Description: PGP signature
-- fedora-selinux-list mailing list fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
