On Wed, 2009-07-22 at 22:19 +0200, Dominick Grift wrote: > On Wed, 2009-07-22 at 16:05 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Wed, 2009-07-22 at 12:57 -0700, Vadym Chepkov wrote: > > > You are right, these types are listed in /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/customizable_types: > > > > > > .... > > > httpd_sys_content_t > > > httpd_sys_htaccess_t > > > httpd_sys_script_exec_t > > > httpd_sys_script_ra_t > > > httpd_sys_script_ro_t > > > httpd_sys_script_rw_t > > > httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t > > > .... > > > > > > May I ask, why do they set this way? > > > > Because users may choose to customize the labeling of their web > > hierarchy and we didn't want restorecon to clobber it. These days that > > isn't so necessary because users can use semanage fcontext -a to add > > entries for their customizations, and that is why customizable_types in > > F11 doesn't include those types. > > > > But should http_user_{content,content_rw,script_exec}_t not be > customizable types though? > > Afaik unpriv users cannot use semanage fcontext. What if a unpriv user > tries to configure a custom apache homedir for example (~/mywww) > > Will that not be relabeled upon restorecon -R -v /home? Good question. Dan? Policy access control, if it ever reaches maturity and integration, could possibly allow unprivileged users to add semanage fcontext entries for their own home directory contents. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- fedora-selinux-list mailing list fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list