On Tue, 2008-04-22 at 12:38 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Tue, 2008-04-22 at 11:55 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Thu, 2008-04-17 at 09:12 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > On Wed, 2008-04-16 at 23:23 -0400, Bill Nottingham wrote: > > > > James Morris (jmorris@xxxxxxxxx) said: > > > > > > You cannot create files in a chroot of a context not known by the > > > > > > host policy. This means that if your host is running RHEL 5, you are > > > > > > unable to compose any trees/images/livecds with SELinux enabled for > > > > > > later releases. > > > > > > > > > > Ok, that's what I suspected. > > > > > > > > > > One of the possible plans for this is to allow a process to run in a > > > > > separate policy namespace, and probably also utilize namespace support in > > > > > general. > > > > > > > > > > This is non-trivial and needs more analysis. > > > > > > > > Incidentally, this is also one of the blockers for policy-in-packages, > > > > rather than a monolithic one. > > > > > > I assume you mean setting down unknown file labels rather than > > > per-namespace or per-chroot policy support. I think they are related > > > but different. The former is required if you always plan to install the > > > files _before_ loading the policy. The latter is required primarily for > > > getting any scriptlets to run in the right security contexts so that any > > > files they create are labeled appropriately within the chroot. > > > > BTW, for reference, a patch to support setting down unknown file labels > > was posted here a couple of years ago: > > http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=114771094617968&w=2 > > And the last version of that patch was: > http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=114840466518263&w=2 > Not that it applies cleanly anymore, of course. Note for anyone trying to revive that patch: please be sure to introduce a new security class for that permission instead of adding it to the security class as I did in that patch, so that we can be certain that this new ability won't be allowed to unconfined domains by default. We do not want unconfined_t user shells to be able to set arbitrary label values w/o no warning that it wasn't valid; we want to limit this to specific programs like rpm that will be aware of the implications and (hopefully) do some validity checking of their own afterward. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- fedora-selinux-list mailing list fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
