-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Robert Nichols wrote: > Being masochistic by nature, I decided to take another crack at getting > SELinux running on my system, and ran into a couple of problems with > some important local scripts. First, some system information: > > System: CentOS 5.1 on an Intel Pentium 4 CPU > kernel-2.6.18-53.1.13.el5 > selinux-policy-targeted-2.4.6-106.el5_1.3 > setools-3.0-3.el5 > > Problem 1: > > Here, my dhclient-exit-hooks script is examining the 'named' configuration > file to verify that the local DNS server will be forwarding queries to the > servers assigned by DHCP. The script will reconfigure and restart 'named' > if necessary, and that would undoubtedly result in more AVCs. Testing > every > combination of things that might happen is impractical, so just running > audit2allow on these AVCs is almost certainly insufficient. Operation of > this script absolutely must not be blocked. How can I open the door wide > enough to ensure that? > > avc: denied { search } for pid=2551 comm="dhclient-script" > name="named" dev=hda6 ino=267649 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:named_zone_t:s0 tclass=dir > avc: denied { search } for pid=2551 comm="dhclient-script" > name="chroot" dev=hda6 ino=267651 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:named_conf_t:s0 tclass=dir > avc: denied { getattr } for pid=2551 comm="dhclient-script" > path="/var/named/chroot/etc/named.conf" dev=hda6 ino=267674 > scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:named_conf_t:s0 tclass=file > avc: denied { read } for pid=2599 comm="grep" name="named.conf" > dev=hda6 ino=267674 scontext=system_u:system_r:dhcpc_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:named_conf_t:s0 tclass=file > > Problem 2: > > Here, my ifup-local script is starting a tcpdump capture on eth1. It is > important to me that this capture begin automatically with the eth1 link > is started. The actual directory where the capture files are stored has > been given a context system_u:object_r:netutils_tmp_t, and that works > without complaint (and does not appear below). Is there a way to make > this work other than blindly running audit2allow on all these AVCs? > Other than perhaps the stderr file (/root/eth1-cap.out), I don't see any > possibility of adjusting target contexts. (Why > system_u:system_r:netutils_t > should be denied search and read permission in /proc is puzzling.) > > avc: denied { write } for pid=2670 comm="tcpdump" > path="/root/eth1-cap.out" dev=hda2 ino=43920 > scontext=system_u:system_r:netutils_t:s0 > tcontext=user_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 tclass=file > avc: denied { search } for pid=2670 comm="tcpdump" name="nscd" > dev=hda6 ino=283420 scontext=system_u:system_r:netutils_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:nscd_var_run_t:s0 tclass=dir > avc: denied { search } for pid=2670 comm="tcpdump" name="sys" > dev=proc ino=-268435428 scontext=system_u:system_r:netutils_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_t:s0 tclass=dir > avc: denied { search } for pid=2670 comm="tcpdump" name="kernel" > dev=proc ino=-268435416 scontext=system_u:system_r:netutils_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 tclass=dir > avc: denied { read } for pid=2670 comm="tcpdump" name="ngroups_max" > dev=proc ino=-268435369 scontext=system_u:system_r:netutils_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 tclass=file > avc: denied { search } for pid=2670 comm="tcpdump" name="/" dev=hdb1 > ino=2 scontext=system_u:system_r:netutils_t:s0 > tcontext=system_u:object_r:default_t:s0 tclass=dir > > That last AVC is puzzling, because the root directory ("/") is not located > on hdb1. That device holds the directory where the capture files are > being stored. Inode 2 on /dev/hdb1 is on mount point "/x" in the > filesystem. > Simplest thing is to run this through # grep avc /var/log/audit2allow | audit2allow -M mypol # semodule -i mypol.pp You might want to first update to the U2 preview policy, available on http://people.redhat.com/dwalsh/SELinux/RHEL5 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkfMZUwACgkQrlYvE4MpobP6BQCfRuiyKhp3dQfk6/eDhj2ZXY3k qGUAn2jzSJsPWOB5pKNF2LwgCvMI26LI =Jq+9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- fedora-selinux-list mailing list fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list