Re: Qustion regarding: selinux / perl-cgi / iptables

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Paul Howarth wrote:
> Paul McAvoy wrote:
>> Hi, I was wondering if anyone has information or can direct me to more
>> details on the following:
>>
>> I have been using a perl cgi script on a personal web-server of mine
>> to control access to SSH.
>> Essentially, it is a knock-knock system.  I would go to a specific URL
>> with the cgi, enter some information, and the perl script would add my
>> ip address to the allowed list for SSH in the fire-wall.
>>
>> I have been working on learning the details with SElinux, and trying
>> to come up with some rules to allow the script to work correctly.
>> There appears to be some kind of conflict either related to the script
>> itself, or being run through httpd and getting access to the IPTables
>> command tools.
>>
>> The CGI script (written in perl) is SUID root.
>> Httpd runs the script.
>> The script will run the iptables command line tools to examine the
>> table (to see if the ip address is already allowed), and also to add a
>> new ip address to the allowed list.
>>
>> My current method of trying to create the appropriate policy is to
>> continue testing the cgi-script, watching the audit log, and running
>> audit2allow on the selected audit messages.
>>
>> My current policy is:
>>
>> ...
>> require {
>>        type modules_conf_t;
>>        type modules_dep_t;
>>        type sysctl_modprobe_t;
>>        type boot_t;
>>        type httpd_sys_script_t;
>>        type modules_object_t;
>>        class capability net_raw;
>>        class dir { getattr search };
>>        class file { read getattr };
>>        class rawip_socket { getopt create };
>> }
>>
>> #============= httpd_sys_script_t ==============
>> allow httpd_sys_script_t boot_t:dir getattr;
>> allow httpd_sys_script_t modules_conf_t:file { read getattr };
>> allow httpd_sys_script_t modules_dep_t:file read;
>> allow httpd_sys_script_t modules_object_t:dir search;
>> allow httpd_sys_script_t self:capability net_raw;
>> allow httpd_sys_script_t self:rawip_socket { getopt create };
>> ...
>>
>> So, my question boils down to this:
>> (I'm running Fedora Core 7)
>> Do I just continue running the audit2allow repeatedly to create a
>> policy to do what I want?
>>
>> Is there a better way to solve this problem?  I am concerned that just
>> creating a policy to allow my script to run will create other more
>> substantial holes.
>>
>> I am also open to creating a tool to update my iptables some other
>> way.  Maybe perl-cgi is not the best method?
>>
>> Thanks in advance for any information!
> 
> The quickest fix for this is probably to relabel your script as
> httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t, which would run that particular script
> unconfined by SELinux without opening up all sorts of extra avenues for
> all the other scripts on your system.
> 
> Longer term I'd be inclined to write a specific policy for this script
> using the apache_content_template, but that's a bigger job.
> 
> Paul.
> 
> -- 
> fedora-selinux-list mailing list
> fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
You could fairly simply write a policy for this script using

system-config-selinux/polgengui

If you go under the modules section of system-config-selinux and select
new.  It will start a Wizard to help you write the policy.  When the
policy is generated, you can add these specific rules without chaning
the behaviour of how all other http scripts would work.


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