But wouldn't it be nice to have an allow mechanism in SELinux in which I could grant access based on it's existing access. What I want to achieve is to be able to add a rule like "If process can read etc_t, then it can also read etc_foo_t"
That would allow me to change context of individual files, and grant access to them by process who already have etc_t, and I wouldn't have to redefine almost the entire selinux context tree just to target a few individual files in /etc for my app.
T.
On 9/18/07, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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Torbjørn Lindahl wrote:
> Good point.
> I probably can live with that.
>
> Still I am not sure if I would like it to have full access to all files
> labelled etc_t . It would be nice to be able to single out only a few of
> them. Perhaps I should look at something other than the targeted policy.
>
> On 9/17/07, Daniel J Walsh < dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Torbjørn Lindahl wrote:
>>>> Hello, I am writing an application that I want to limit using selinux.
>>>>
>>>> audit.log shows that it wants access to /etc/nsswitch.conf and
> /etc/hosts -
>>>> which doesn't seem to unreasonable, however both these have types etc_t
> ,
>>>> and allowing myapp_t to read etc_t would also give it access to for
> example
>>>> /etc/passwd, which i do not want.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Do I have to invent a new type for these two files to be able to keep my
>>>> application from the other etc_t files in /etc ?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
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>>>> fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx
>>>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
> Yes you can, but the more different file_context that you have in /etc,
> the harder they will be to maintain.
>
> Reading /etc/passwd is not as dangerous as being able to read
> /etc/shadow. So consider if this is really necessary.
>>
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All of the current policies including mls allow reading of etc_t for
most domains, and /etc/passwd is labeled etc_t.
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--
mvh
Torbjørn Lindahl
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