On Fri, 2007-04-27 at 13:21 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Thu, 2007-04-26 at 20:00 -0500, Joe Nall wrote: > > > >> On Apr 26, 2007, at 3:18 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > >> > >> > >>> On Thu, 2007-04-26 at 14:55 -0500, Joe Nall wrote: > >>> > >>>> I'm running an mls/permissive policy on FC6 and service and system- > >>>> config-services start daemons in the user's selinux context rather > >>>> than those in /etc/selinux/mls/contexts/initrc_context. Since our > >>>> policies use init_daemon_domain to establish domain transitions, they > >>>> are not transitioning into the correct domain on user initiated (re) > >>>> starts. > >>>> > >>>> "run_init service <service> restart" - works, but leaves us in a > >>>> situation where documentation doesn't match experience. What is the > >>>> right approach to getting the transitions to work properly? Patch > >>>> service and friends? Write a more generic transition? > >>>> > >>> That should be governed by the DIRECT_INITRC= setting in the refpolicy > >>> build.conf (or as overridden on the make command line in the .spec > >>> file > >>> for building the policy). DIRECT_INITRC=y (as in -targeted) turns on > >>> direct role transitions and domain transitions from > >>> sysadm_r:sysadm_t to > >>> system_r:initrc_t and/or system_r:<daemon domain>, although we > >>> can't yet > >>> automatically transition the user identity field. > >>> > >>> If you want the DIRECT_INITRC=n situation, then yes, you need to > >>> integrate run_init or similar functionality into the init script > >>> and/or > >>> service script infrastructure, as they have done in Hardened Gentoo. > >>> > >> Why does run_init prompt for a root password rather than perform a > >> role check? > >> > > > > The role authorization is handled transparently by policy - if you > > weren't in an authorized role/domain, then you couldn't use run_init to > > transition to system_r:initrc_t anyway. Same as with newrole. The > > re-authentication stage is purely a (weak) countermeasure against > > invocation by malicious code without user consent - if we had a trusted > > path mechanism in Linux, we'd use that instead. > > > > > Most people are adding pam_rootok to /etc/pam.d/run_init so that it will > work for sysadm_t. Ok, they are certainly free to choose that approach (and it nicely allows for either option with a single run_init binary). As long as they understand the rationale for it. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- fedora-selinux-list mailing list fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
