Jouni Viikari wrote:
Hi,
I just noticed that I was able to run cgi-scripts on apache which type was
bin_t instead of httpd_sys_script_exec_t. Is this expected nowadays? I
am using FC5 with the latest updates
(selinux-policy-targeted-2.2.25-3.fc5)
apache is allowed to execute bin_t.
Also this bin_t script was able to read files which were by accident
httpd_sys_script_exec_t type.
The fact the script was bin_t does not mean that it was running in that
domain.
Basically their is no domain transition happening. Apache runs in
httpd_t, which is allowed to run bin_t. But it will stay in the context
of httpd_t. So when the bin_t labeled application runs
httpd_sys_script_exec_t, from SELinux point of view it is httpd_t
executing httpd_sys_script_exec_t. In this case their will be a
transition to httpd_sys_script_t.
My booleans:
# getsebool -a | grep httpd
allow_httpd_anon_write --> off
allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write --> off
httpd_builtin_scripting --> on
httpd_can_network_connect --> on
httpd_can_network_connect_db --> off
httpd_can_network_relay --> off
httpd_disable_trans --> off
httpd_enable_cgi --> on
httpd_enable_ftp_server --> off
httpd_enable_homedirs --> on
httpd_ssi_exec --> on
httpd_suexec_disable_trans --> off
httpd_tty_comm --> off
httpd_unified --> off
BTW, is there a way or tools to find out what e.g. httpd_exec_t program is
allowed to do (and what do the booleans really affect) on currently active
policy?
apol
Best regards,
Jouni
--
fedora-selinux-list mailing list
fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
--
fedora-selinux-list mailing list
fedora-selinux-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-selinux-list
