On Wed, 2005-01-05 at 02:21, Bob Kashani wrote: > I read the thread and I seem to understand the technical reason behind > why ldconfig is restricted in the way that it is (the security side of > the issue). But is seems a little harsh from a usability point of view > since for example, you can no longer run ldconfig in a chroot in your > home dir. I like fine grained security but isn't the whole idea behind > policy-targeted to enable security without restricting usability too > much? I would understand not allowing ldconfig to execute in /home with > policy-strict but shouldn't policy-targeted allow you to do this > regardless of the potential security issues? Do the security concerns in > this case outweigh the usability issues? I'm not clear on why ldconfig runs in its own domain at all under targeted policy (vs. unconfined_t). It used to just run unconfined_t in older versions of the targeted policy. Is it an attempt to preserve the type on /etc/ld.so.cache via the file type transition rules? -- Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> National Security Agency
