On Mon, 30 Aug 2004 05:32, Tom London <selinux@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> --- /root/src.package/policy/domains/program/dbusd.te 2004-08-29
> 11:38:27.000000000 -0700
> +++ dbusd.te 2004-08-29 12:19:25.000000000 -0700
> @@ -32,3 +32,7 @@
>
> # SE-DBus specific permissions
> allow { dbus_client_domain userdomain } { dbusd_t self }:dbus { send_msg
> }; +
> +allow user_t etc_dbusd_t:dir { search };
> +allow user_t etc_dbusd_t:file { getattr read };
> +allow user_t user_t:netlink_selinux_socket { bind create };
One thing to remember is that any time you see user_t in policy it's a local
customisation or a bug.
In this case it seems to me that one correct way of writing policy for this is
the following:
allow { dbus_client_domain userdomain } etc_dbusd_t:dir { search };
allow { dbus_client_domain userdomain } etc_dbusd_t:file { getattr read };
allow { dbus_client_domain userdomain } user_t:netlink_selinux_socket { bind
create };
But then we are granting almost every domain that has any significance in the
security of the system read access. So why not just label the files as etc_t
and remove the etc_dbusd_t type entirely?
--
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