Stephen Smalley wrote:
Another separate example policy would be very good. Additional different example policies would 1) demonstrate the flexibility on the concept and mechanism and 2) provide usage information that would useful in designing a better 'language' or higher level of abstraction. If there is an improved 'language', implementation and usage would be facilitated.On Fri, 2004-04-30 at 05:40, Pete Chown wrote:
I think this is especially true for a new security technology. Most people's view of security is quite simplistic: they want the bad guys kept out, without their work being interfered with. If SELinux interferes with their work, they will turn it off, reasoning that normal Unix security has kept the bad guys out so far. They are then unlikely to try it again later however much people tell them that the policy has been improved.
So how would people feel about a separate relaxed policy that allows everything in the system to run completely unconfined except for a small set of specific services, e.g. apache, bind, postfix, ... That would ensure that SELinux wouldn't get in the way of users, while providing some protection benefit for network-facing services.
Richard Hally
