On Fri, 2004-04-30 at 10:39 -0400, Bill Rugolsky Jr. wrote: > I concur with that sentiment, and didn't mean to imply that a relaxed > policy is not desirable. Not having to frantically rebuild a server > app the moment an exploit is discovered is reason enough to have SELinux > confining all network-facing servers. I only wanted to highlight that > expectations need to be reset as both the default policy has been loosened, > and the relaxed policy will loosen things further. I would hate for it > to reflect negatively on SELinux when someone exploits an FC2 default > SELinux install; the press will not make fine distinctions, and there > will be gloating from other corners. Toward that end, I think it is > important that users understand where along the "low-medium-high" > spectrum they have set their security. Definitely -- my plan is to provide the spectrum of choices and also have accompanying explanatory text so that users can make an informed decision about what they want to use SELinux-wise on their system > Having SELinux on by default, even with a relatively permissive policy, > will (1) ensure that the code is exercised, and (2) force developers, > packagers, etc., to think about the required logic, and address any > performance problems, so we can get to a more secure default install. Yep, and hopefully then in the longer term, we can move to more and more locked down setups as users become used to the concepts introduced by SELinux and applications become aware of it. Jeremy
