[Bug 1394962] Review Request: clevis - Automated decryption framework

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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1394962



--- Comment #11 from Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@xxxxxxxxx> ---
(In reply to Nathaniel McCallum from comment #10)
> The clevis-decrypt binary is not executed as root. We drop privileges much
> earlier than that. See:
> https://github.com/latchset/clevis/blob/master/clevis-luks-udisks2.c#L384
> 
> However, your concern is still valid because we pass information obtained as
> root to that process. So it still represents a security concern. I'd love to
> chat with you on IRC to discuss some of my concerns with my own code if you
> have time.

Yeah, I think it's a concern, also because the program uses the information
received *from* the other binary.

Please ping me on IRC when you're around. I saw your ping yesterday after I
returned home, but you were already gone...

> Yeah, I agree. The main reason I haven't done this is because it makes
> in-tree unit testing (after build, before install) more difficult.
> Suggestions welcome.

I'd add a C define with the full path (using AC_DEFINE or similar), and
allow overriding it using a shell variable in non-suid process.

const char *p = secure_getenv("CLEVIS_HELPER_PATH");
if (p)
       return p;
else
       return HELPER_PATH;

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