David Partridge wrote:
David M. Partridge Tangible Software Inc. Sr. Security Engineer 2010 Corporate Ridge Suite 620 McLean, Virginia 22102 Office 800-913-9901 x 3001 Mobile 571-286-9628 Fax 703-288-1226 dpartridge@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx-----Original Message----- From: Rich Megginson [mailto:rmeggins@xxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Friday, April 10, 2009 10:40 AM To: General discussion list for the Fedora Directory server project. Subject: Re: Proposed new features for 1.3 David Partridge wrote:Use case example for certmap.conf for end user: Customer has desire to share Enterprise Directory information acrossWANfor contact information sharing, but has requirement for strong authentication using PKI. PKI trust is a PKI Mesh utilizing cross certification. Users information in Directory Server One (DS1) are associated with users issued certificates from PKI One (PKI1).Usersinformation in Directory Server Two (DS2) are associated with users issued certificates from PKI Two (PKI2). DS1 has no awareness or cross population of entries with DS2, butPKI1is cross certified with PKI2 and trusted by both populations. Users associated with PKI1 have a business requirement to strongly authenticate with DS2 to locate and collaborate with population ofusersin DS2, but have no entry in DS2 and vice versa. By removingcurrentcapability to strongly authenticate based on TLS configuration buthaveNO DN in DS you are removing capability to use SASL External in acrosscertified PKI environment. User of the product will be forced touseSASL GSSAPI that causes other security issues or requirements tosetupall of these Kerberos trust and ticketing handling that should notberequired, difficult to sustain and place external dependencies onusageof the DS product in a federated environment as described. If directory is utilized as something OTHER than repository forpeoplesimilar challenges will present themselves when certificates areissuedfor devices, roles, and groups. Examples include but are notlimited toVOIP device address book capabilities such as CISCO VOIP phones orcallmanagers, Potentially for extending security capability in hoststhathave host based certificates that may require use of the directoryforbackend business processes were Certificate trust and regularexpressionchecks of DN utilized for the TLS session may be sufficient toutilizefor ACI binding rules.So you want to allow a user from DS1 to authenticate to DS2, without having a user entry in DS2. Then use access control, bind resource limits, groups, roles, CoS, etc. without having a real user entry. I think that would be useful for auth in general, not just cert based auth. It comes up often in SASL/GSSAPI auth (wanting to use Kerberos auth without having to have a user entry), and is necessary to support the types of devices you mention.[David Partridge] DS1 and DS2 for clarity are only containers of information for users toconsume. A user may have data in neither, one or both DS, but has PKI credentials that are trusted by neither, one or both DS. If trusted the user should be authenticated via TLS using mutual authentication using PKI. If not trusted user is turned away by TLS mutual authentication.
Ok. So just in general allow authentication if user doesn't exist.
Sure. Unauthenticated users should not be allowed to consume resources or discover information. We have some roadmap items to disallow and lockdown anonymous users even more than we do today.Authentication and access control are two separate and distinctprocesses.If user is not authenticated why should I allow them to get to the point of exposing internal directory resources to evaluate access control, bind resource limits, groups, roles, CoS, etc. Believe I had this conversation with Bob Lord long time ago when we discovered a previous security issue.
Ok. Right - I want to allow those capabilities without requiring a DN in the directory.If user is authenticated capabilities of DN mapping with sophisticated access control, bind resource limits, groups, roles, CoS, etc. continue to be valuable for providing different privileges and capabilities. But the ability should not be absolute to requiring a DN in the directory NOR would I want to try to build rules based on every PKI end user DN that may have a chain of trust that is acceptable based on adding to NSS Truststore. There will be some cases that the fact that they authenticated regardless of SASL mechanism should be able to provide 'SOME' access.
One of the things that cert based auth does now is to retrieve the userCertificate from the user's entry and compare it against the cert presented in the auth request. But that (verifyCert) can be turnedoffnow. Would you want the ability to compare the cert presented forauthagainst the known cert for that identity?[David Partridge] Depends - For our use cases identity certificates [ digital signature, nonrepudiation key usage] are NEVER published or stored outside of PKI CA infrastructure (will let the Dogtag team explain reasons). Therefore the certificate used for SSL will NEVER be a match to the certificate attribute in the directory which is merely one or more email encryption certificates [key encipherment key usage] that corresponds to mail attribute in directory. If directory was for PKI CA infrastructure matching the certificate binary value may be useful, but unnecessary if implementation of PKI done correctly. Matching binary contradicts why the PKI exists in the first place. In most cases PKI exists so you do not need prior knowledge of the end user of the certificate to know that the individual/system met identity vetting requirements and is the only individual/system that possessed private key to make it do what it does.
Ok.
David M. Partridge Tangible Software Inc. dpartridge@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx-----Original Message----- From: Rich Megginson [mailto:rmeggins@xxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2009 11:47 PM To: General discussion list for the Fedora Directory serverproject.Subject: Re: Proposed new features for 1.3 David Partridge wrote:Would like to see additional monitoring flexibility for snmp -whenconfiguring multiple ds instances with same port on singlemultihomedhostmonitoring information is agregated by port in the monitoring notbyinstance and port.Please provide more information on deprecation of certmap.conf.We would instead use the SASL mapping functionality to map thesubjectDNin the cert to a DN that the DS knows about. The SASL mapping codeismuch more powerful and flexible than the certmap.conf code. *http://tinyurl.com/cqe42v *Need flexibility to not rely on dn in cert mapping to anything indirectory and rely on successful tls mutual authentication andtruststoreconfiguration. I'm not sure I understand - do you want the ability to do cert auth without having to have a real entry in the directory server that corresponds to the subjectDN?Script to provide index analysis based on data in the directorytoprovide the following info:Search performance efficiency of index and index type based onreturnlimits, and scanidslistlimit.Compressed ldif(gzip) capability for export, import, andinitializationusage. Ok - Thanks - this is all good stuff.Dave Partridge Sent from my Windows Mobile(r) phone. -----Original Message----- From: Rich Megginson <rmeggins@xxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Thursday, April 09, 2009 7:23 PM To: General discussion list for the Fedora Directory serverproject.<fedora-directory-users@xxxxxxxxxx>Subject: Re: Proposed new features for1.3Andrey Ivanov wrote:I continue with my listThanks - I've added many of these to the list - questions below.* the server should be able to return the members of dynamicgroups"on the fly" as if it were real members, the membership attribute should be configurable - uniqueMember, member or anotherI put this on the Future list: Dynamic group expansion * Define a dynamic group, and have the member/uniqueMemberattributeof this group automatically be populated by the server * clients can then just search for member like with a regularstaticposix group* support of other virtual attributes generated "on the fly"Can you explain this a little more?* pam passthrough plug-in should take into account at least the account activation/desactivation (bug *470684* <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=470684> ). There isacomment about some additional useful features it in th READMEfileofthis plug-in : We need to worry about account expiration or lockout e.g. theuser'scredentials are valid but the user has been locked out of his/her account, or the password has expired, or something like that.Someofthis can be handled by LDAP e.g. returning password policycontrolvalues when the password has expired. * a way to synchronise the configuration of indexes (each time weaddan index on one of the replicated servers we need to make itmanuallyon all the others) and some other parameters in "cn=config"betweenthe replicated servers (a little like the "configuration"partitionin active directory), the schema changes are already replicatedwhichis very goodI'm calling this feature "Configuration replication" - I think itcouldbe useful for other sorts of configuration.* enforced attribute syntax validationAlready on the list - Syntax validation checking* re-verify and validate conformance of the syntaxes, casesensitivityand their matching rules to RFC (https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-directory-users/2008-July/msg00041.html)Already on the list* unix socket autobind still does not seem to work (ldapi) - https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-directory-users/2009-February/msg00112.html.It could be very useful for various maintenance scripts runningontheserver.We tested this with 1.2.0 and it seems to work. You tested abuildfromsource? Did you use --enable-autobind with configure? Did yourestartthe server after configuring your autobind and sasl mapping?* verification of the server from the viewpoint of memory leaks.Thsize of the memory used by the server grows with time (normallywedon't restart the sevrr during several months, so i can followthestats)We regularly run the server test suite with valgrind enabled. I'mnotaware of any per connection or per operation leaks. What exactlyareyou seeing?* logconv.pl - very useful script, add some more options/adjustments(for example, a switch to hide unindexed searches in verbosemode).Weuse it as logwatch. * a perl script to show the replication statistics (there is oneforthe we page generation statistics, something more basic,text-onlywould be very welcome) in text mode - to receiveth reports byonce per day like logwatch for exampleWhat sort of information are you looking for? ldapsearch canprovidemost of the useful information.* regular expressions in ACIs (i know, it is very difficult todo,somaybe somewhere in the timescale of the version 10.0 ? :)) - for example, allow a user to add or modify a value just in case thenewvalue mathes the regex. Or the group or dn of the user matchestheregex...You can do some of that currently with targetattrfilters - see *http://tinyurl.com/3yo88r We added support in 1.2.0 to allow you to specify group membershipwithLDAP search specifications, which does allow some wildcarding, sothatmight help too. ** simplify the creation of new syntaxes and their validation/ enforcement (version 11.0? :))Can you elaborate?* virtual views allowing to map not only the trees but also the attributes ('cn' instead of 'uid' in a subtree, for example)Can you elaborate?* enable regex in certmap.conf for mapping the CNs of thecertificatesduring the certificate authentification of usersThis is on the list as Get rid of certmap.conf - use SASL mapping (cert auth is reallyjustSASL/EXTERNAL) The sasl mapping code uses regular expressionsOther than that i just want to emphasize the great job you aredoingadding new features and especially the fantastic reactivity infixingsome critical server bugs (usually it takes only one or two daystohave the necessary diff in bugzilla!) Thank you and please continue the development of this directoryserver!And thank you for your suggestions.Thanks - I've added these notes tohttp://directory.fedoraproject.org/wiki/Roadmap#Version_1.3Anyone else? C'mon - surely you have an opinion about anewfeature. Thanks for all your hard work on this!-------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fedora-directory-users mailing list Fedora-directory-users@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-usersThis e-mail and any attachment is intended for the above namerecipient(s) only and may contain confidential or privilegedinformation.If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender anddeletethe message. Failure to maintain the confidentiality of thisandany attachment may subject you to penalties under applicable law.CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including anyattachments,is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged information or otherwise be protectedbylaw.Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution isprohibited. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender byreplye-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.-- Fedora-directory-users mailing list Fedora-directory-users@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-usersThis e-mail and any attachment is intended for the above namerecipient(s) only and may contain confidential or privilegedinformation.If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender anddeletethe message. Failure to maintain the confidentiality of this e-mailandany attachment may subject you to penalties under applicable law.CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including anyattachments,is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged information or otherwise be protected bylaw.Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution isprohibited. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by replye-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.-- Fedora-directory-users mailing list Fedora-directory-users@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-usersThis e-mail and any attachment is intended for the above name recipient(s) only and may contain confidential or privileged information. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete the message. Failure to maintain the confidentiality of this e-mail and any attachment may subject you to penalties under applicable law. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged information or otherwise be protected by law. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. -- Fedora-directory-users mailing list Fedora-directory-users@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-users
<<attachment: smime.p7s>>
-- Fedora-directory-users mailing list Fedora-directory-users@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-directory-users