Howard Chu wrote:
From: David Boreham <david_list@xxxxxxxxxxx>> Remember that authentication is not the same as authorization - having > the valid certificate just proves who you are to the server; the > server doesn't have to accord you any privileges/authorization just > because of that.Correct, but the OP _wanted_ to make an authorization decision for this identity, not just perform authentication.Yes, I'm sure eventually the OP would want to make an authorization decision, but their complaint showed that they weren't even able to get past authentication. The fact that FDS doesn't support distributed authentication makes the authorization question a bit moot.
FDS does support certain types of distributed authentication - Kerberos (via GSSAPI) and pass through authentication. You can also pass authentication through to PAM.
I think what he wants is to be able to use the subject DN in the client's cert directly as the bind identity for access control purposes. This isn't supported. Not because the original developers missed some grand X.500 vision, but becausenobody needed to do that (and haven't for 10 years, until now...).Personal experience tells me that many people have needed distributed authentication in the past 10 years, and it's been used extensively in OpenLDAP for the past 6 or so. The folks who designed LDAP plainly didn't consider it, just as they didn't consider the majority of the implications of true distributed operation.
Ok. So, how exactly does OpenLDAP support this? saslauthd?
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