Re: End of bind-chroot-admin script

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Alan Cox <alan@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> Its also inadequate for some forms of attack. If I can persuade your
> named to run code of my choice in a chroot without selinux then I can
> still use your box as a spam machine, botnet host, DoS attack tool,
> proxy, etc .. all without breaking the chroot.

Can be prevented with traditional tools too:

iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner named -j o-NAMED




Enrico

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