On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 4:39 PM, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Wednesday 29 October 2008 15:25:15 Colin Walters wrote: >> On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 3:13 PM, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > 1) We've spent a lot of time on getting audit right. We can tell what >> > account was logged in under and find every single application that was >> > started as a result of that login. Message passing breaks this. >> >> True, though how interesting is the question of "what binaries were >> executed" as opposed to the system having enough intelligence to >> display security-relevant information? > > Not sure I follow your question. I am talking about /proc/<pid>/loginuid and > sessionid. Oh. Well, if your application uses PolicyKit there are *two* programs; the privileged mechanism, and the unprivileged application. The unprivileged application of course maintains the loginuid. > No this is about PolicyKit being another MAC system that needs configuring. Of course it would be ideal if there were One True MAC system, but AFAIK the story on SELinux is still that the system must be secure without it, and other vendors that we care about from the desktop perspective (personally I just care about Ubuntu and OpenSolaris) haven't yet finished integrating it. Even when we do depend on SELinux (and I would advocate that), PolicyKit fills a useful role as "coarse grained" system on top of the far more fine grained SELinux policy. Also, by having application authors forced to split applications into privileged mechanisms and unprivileged frontends, the SELinux policy for the mechanism can be much stronger. > Where's the GUI or commandline tool that lets me configure it? I may need to > have auditing of who changed what entry in that file. When I chmod 4755 a > program, I know who changed it, what the old and new values are, when they > did it, and what the outcome was. There's no real story on that other than "uid 0" and $EDITOR yet. This is basically the same as all the other OS config files. > True...but this is a discussion that needs to be had so that it can be fixed. > Auditing from user space is not trustworthy and that's why its done from the > kernel. Hmm? SELinux userspace enforcers (dbus and X.org) are using the audit system; I don't think it's reasonable to say that the kernel is the only component of the TCB. -- fedora-devel-list mailing list fedora-devel-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-devel-list
