Re: Time to resurrect multi-key signatures in RPM?

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Bojan Smojver wrote:


But what if it is the src rpm that is compromised so the builds will be identical because they both contain the modification?

That is not exactly the compromise of the build system and/or Fedora key, now is
it?

Is one significantly harder than the other? If it goes unnoticed the end result could be the same.

If your own contributors are subverting the system by uploading borked
source, the mutli-key system isn't going to help (and I never claimed that).

I'm not proposing an intentional trojan source submission, but a compromise that modifies it in an unexpected way. I'd think if you go to the trouble to compare builds you'd also want an end-to-end validity check on the input to be sure it wasn't compromised either at the source or in transit.

--
  Les Mikesell
   lesmikesell@xxxxxxxxx

--
fedora-devel-list mailing list
fedora-devel-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-devel-list

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[Index of Archives]     [Fedora Announce]     [Fedora Kernel]     [Fedora Testing]     [Fedora Formulas]     [Fedora PHP Devel]     [Kernel Development]     [Fedora Legacy]     [Fedora Maintainers]     [Fedora Desktop]     [PAM]     [Red Hat Development]     [Gimp]     [Yosemite News]
  Powered by Linux