mån 2008-06-23 klockan 12:58 -0400 skrev Chuck Anderson: > Right, but the default firewall rules don't do that. The default filrewall doesn't filter anything on the loopback interface, does it? Or you mean traffic on an external interface but using a source IP address of the host? > By default maybe the firewall should be off. Well, a firewall should only be an added protection. If you want a caching nameserver locally then make sure it only binds to the loopback interface even if you have a firewall. Same thing with sendmail. It only listens locally by default, even though there's a firewall. That's how it should be. Anything else is way too risky. A quick service iptables stop shouldn't leave you wide open, just without a safety net. It's probably good to have a firewall, but regular users needs a good tool to manage it. The question is, what range of options does it need and how much of the configuration can be automated? Some thoughts: Not everyone would want the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range open for UDP/TCP/SCTP, but it should be an option, perhaps the default. Options for specific service-related ports such as ssh or VNC. (Btw, VNC, security and usability is unfortunately a topic for a whole thread.) Profiles for "server", "desktop" and so on. Manage both iptables and ip6tables together. Open ports automatically based on running services? Then what's the point? Perhaps a built-in view of listening sockets? With sane defaults, users installing a desktop machine shouldn't have to care about the firewall. And on server machines the sane defaults should mean you have fairly good protection and only need to open up things for services you start. But yes, the above can be done with SELinux as well. Maybe that will could actually provide a better user experience since you'd get error messages when binding sockets instead of mostly silently dropped packets. /abo -- fedora-devel-list mailing list fedora-devel-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-devel-list
