Re: Updating selinux-policy-targeted Causes SELinux Denials

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Paul Howarth wrote:
> Daniel J Walsh wrote:
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>>
>> Richi Plana wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Should I be concerned that every time an update to
>>> selinux-policy-targeted occurs, it causes actions that the current
>>> running SELinux seems to prevent? I'm talking about SELinux
>>> preventing /usr/sbin/semodule (semanage_t) and /sbin/restorecon
>>> (restorecon_t) "write"ing to a pipe with label "rpm_t".
>>>
>>> Are these actions legal? And does SELinux preventing them cause an error
>>> in the actual install? Or should these just be treated as warnings?
>>>
>>> I'm guessing that the selinux applications are just trying to
>>> communicate back to the RPM process. I'm wondering if there's anything
>>> important in that communication that should be allowed, or if not, there
>>> must be some way to clean this up.
>>>
>>> (If this isn't the right place to ask, could someone redirect me to the
>>> correct one?)
>>> -- 
>>>
>>> Richi Plana
>>>
>> No,  I am hoping to eliminate a lot of these in the future.  What these
>> avc's are referring to is the redirection of stdout/stderr.  When rpm is
>> running an update it redirects the terminal output to its fifo_files. So
>> any confined domain that runs as part of a post install script will
>> check whether it has access to stdin, stdout, stderr on the terminal or
>> whatever is acting as the terminal.  Since these confined domains do not
>> have policy allowing them to talk to pipes owned by rpm, the kernel
>> generates avc messages and closes the file descriptors and replaces them
>> with open file descriptors to /dev/null.  The apps will continue running
>> and complete successfully, but ugly avc messages are generated.  In
>> Updates to policy I am going to globally start dontauditing these access.
>>
>>
>> # Allow all domains to use fds past to them
>> allow domain domain:fd use;
>> optional_policy(`
>>     rpm_dontaudit_rw_pipes(domain)
>> ')
>>
>> Should be in Fedora 8 and beyond as well as in the next update to
>> Fedora 7.
>>
>> Redirection of Stdout/Stderr account for the largest percentage of
>> SELinux AVC's and most are just noice.
> 
> The net effect of this is to throw away any scriptlet output (e.g. error
> messages), isn't it? Whilst people running a GUI update tool won't see
> these anyway, us luddites that still use yum from the command line so as
> to see if there are any problems during an update won't be able to see
> this output.
> 
> Yes, I know that this doesn't represent a change from current policy; I
> usually add local policy to allow this output when I see the avcs, but
> if they're dontaudited then I won't see any hint of there being a problem.
> 
> Paul.
> 
Your right, I will change it to rpm_rw_pipes

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