Re: Should we settle on one SSL implementation?

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Paul Wouters <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> Also, it is believed that if SHA-1 is compromised, the attack would work
> similarly to SHA-256 et al.

Current SHA-1 attacks reduce "only" the numbers of steps to find a
collision (e.g. 2^60 instead of 2^80).  Similar attacks for SHA-256/512
will probably require 2^90 / 2^180 steps which should be enough for the
next ten years...


Enrico

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