Tomas Mraz wrote:
On Wed, 2007-03-21 at 20:42 +0100, Thomas M Steenholdt wrote:
I agree that compromising a user account is still bad. But not nearly as
bad as root access (if one must choose), but if root access through ssh
is disabled by default, attack scripts would have to *guess* a user to
bruteforce and can't rely on bruteforcing "root" who exists on every
*nix system. So this would allow immediate ssh access to admins (ssh as
user and su -) to newly installed machines. Admin is free to remotely
log in, install public keys and reconfigure sshd as he sees fit, but
he's allowed to do it from his administrative workstation instead of the
physical machine console. This makes a lot of sense in my world.
Except the regular users are created in firstboot which might be
inaccessible when the system is installed remotely.
Perhaps this could be changed, if need be.
/Thomas
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