Steve G wrote:
so in the absence of SELinux (e.g. CAPP-only configuration), any uid 0 process
can mutate its loginuid later to mask the original one,
Or it can delete the audit logs or re-write syslog or install a rootkit covering
everything up. The only defence against this kind of tampering is remote logging.
and in the presence of SELinux, any program authorized for audit_control can
mutate its loginuid later (so a smaller exposure, but still a possibility).
So...why doesn't policy restrict this even further so that the 10 apps that need
to set this are the *only* ones that can do so?
The list is: login, sshd, vsftpd, postfix, procmail, cron, at, gdm, kdm, & xdm.
That might break any alternatives to these programs, e.g. from Fedora
Extras, such as proftpd, wouldn't it?
Paul.
--
fedora-devel-list mailing list
fedora-devel-list@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-devel-list
