Re: Switching XZ for ZSTD?

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On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:00 PM Arnie T via devel
<devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hello Kevin,
>
> > I'm hopeful some things will come out of this as it's a chance for us to
> > look at our processes and improve them.
>
> I'm glad that's happening.  It seems to me that improving those processes would be Distro decisions.  Which I keep understanding don't really exist.  At least not quickly.
> So I'm confused still. But glad.
>
>
> > > 1] Lack of committer 'Real' identity confidence and verification is a problem.
>
> > IMHO this isn't a problem. We don't have a right to demand anything from
> > open source projects. We can ask, we can urge, we can contribute and
> > change things, we can choose to not use something, or fork something.
>
> I really don't suggest 'demanding' anything.  I do think it's wise to make choices to avoid it.  Like just my example of a critical-path XZ with one developer vs a critical-path ZSTD built & maintained in a Facebook FOSS project.
>
> I know from just a business view I would never enter into a 'critical' contract without "knowing" the principal persons.  Of course you must know what you need "knowing" to be.

Careful, for now you're approaching another scalability issue of the
community development model.
I mean, as chill as he is, even Daniel Stenberg [1] must have a limit
on the amount of beers he can handle.

> > > 2] Undetected differences source + packaging in repo vs tarballs are unchecked.
> >
> >
> > Yeah, a lot of the discussion has been in this area.
> >
> > I'm wondering if perhaps we shouldn't revisit source-git, or at least
> > a variant of it where we keep the upstream sources in a branch always
> > and apply packaging on top of that and build from there.
>
> I'm not sure what the packaging tools and rules are here.
> It seems to me that repo source with an attested commit (signature? published hash?) can serve as the one source of truth.
> Then users can pull the commit or the on-demand API-generated tarball.  I guess that could be subject to for example Github's or Gitlab's API tarball generators being hacked.  But that seems less probable of a concern.
>
> > > 3] Under-resourced development creates risk; 'Many eyes' bench depth in development is needed.
> >
> > Yep. I think also visibility of changes can be improved.
> > So, maintainers know more about whats in a new version and how it works.
>
> You can implement tools to increase the visibility for sure. And procedures.
>
> Also just the "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" that comes with using a larger project helps.
>
> Thanks for the discussion.
>
> Cheers!
>
>  Arnie

[1] https://daniel.haxx.se
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