On Sat, Mar 30 2024 at 09:37:44 AM +00:00:00, Richard W.M. Jones
<rjones@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In the xz case this wouldn't have been enough, it turns out we would
also have to delete m4/build-to-host.m4, which then autoreconf
regenerates. I don't fully understand why that is.
I agree that running autoreconf on our packages makes sense to start
doing. Still, to avoid this backdoored m4 file, we would have needed to
stop using release tarballs altogether and switch to using git tags
directly instead. That would at least force the malicious attacker to
commit their code to version control, making it slightly harder to hide
the attack.
Michael
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