Re: Restricting automounting of uncommon filesystems?

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Am 23.07.23 um 09:35 schrieb Vitaly Zaitsev via devel:
On 22/07/2023 08:01, Matthew Garrett wrote:
1) Automounting of removable media exposes the kernel to a lot of
untrusted input

Disable automatic mount by default. Problem solved.



We use a whitelist approach here based
on usbguard daemon (hw centered), and

# cat /etc/dconf/db/local.d/s-media-automount
[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
automount=false
automount-open=false

Our scenario is clearly modelled around an user
in front of a GUI. So, it tackles it in different
layers and the actual fs attack vector is not addressed.

Should a "middleware" based on guestmount just check
for the integrity of the fs or keeping it in such
sandbox?

--
Leon








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