On Mon, Jul 04, 2022 at 07:20:32PM -0000, Sharpened Blade via devel wrote: > With virtual machines, nothing can actually be verified completely, > the host running the vm can, 1) Modify the firmware to intercept > anything the attacker wants, or 2) directly intercept things at the > cpu level. With SEV-SNP (amd) or TDX (intel) cpu extensions you can avoid that. You get launch measurement: Basically the cpu calculates a hash of the initial VM state and this can be verified later to make sure the system actually runs the firmware you want it run. The host also is not allowed to modify (or even see) guest state. take care, Gerd _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure
