Re: Landing a larger-than-release change (distrusting SHA-1 signatures)

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> On 16. Mar 2022, at 00:04, Tom Hughes via devel <devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On 15/03/2022 22:45, Robert Relyea wrote:
> 
>> 1) in fedora 37, provide a policy that turns SHA-1 off. in our testing, we encourage people to run with that policy and write bugs against components.
> 
> That policy already exists in Fedora 34 and 35 where the FUTURE policy
> does not allow SHA1 in signature algorithms.

In the case of OpenSSL, that only affects use of SHA1 as signature algorithms in TLS.
It does not cover arbitrary signatures with a SHA1 digest, which is what we are proposing.


HTH,
Clemens

-- 
Clemens Lang
RHEL Crypto Team
Red Hat


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