Re: Landing a larger-than-release change (distrusting SHA-1 signatures)

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On Tue, Mar 8, 2022 at 3:11 PM Simo Sorce <simo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2022-03-08 at 20:51 +0100, Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 08, 2022 at 07:40:15PM +0100, Alexander Sosedkin wrote:
> > > the only realistic way to weed out its reliance on SHA-1 signatures
> > > from all of its numerous dark corners is to break them.
> > > Make creation and verification fail in default configuration.
> >
> > That sounds like a terrible plan. We should make newer hashes
> > the default, and we can make tools print a warning if sha1 is used
> > where it shouldn't, but please don't break things on purpose.
> >
> > For many many things sha1 is just fine. Just like md5 or even
> > crc32. Not everything is about cryptographic security.
>
> I would like to make it clear that this is just for *Cryptographic
> Signatures*, this is not a plan to block SHA-1 for all uses.
>
> And for Cryptographic Signatures everything is about cryptography and
> SHA-1 is not safe anymore.
>
> And to be extra clear this means: Certificates, TLS session setup,
> DNSSEC (although a lot of signatures are still SHA-1 based there ...),
> VPNs session establishment, PGP, etc...
>
> > Also, users will want to verify old signatures essentially forever.
>
> This is only reasonable for stuff like emails, where you may have a
> reasonable expectation that the archived messages have not been
> tampered with after the fact. Allowing verification of signatures with
> SHA-1 for any "online" communication would be pointless.
>
> > This should be always possible. And finally, the world is huge,
> > and other users will provide sha1 signatures no matter what we do,
> > and it is better to check those than to completely ignore them.
>
> We need to move the needle at some point. We will be able to set LEGACY
> crypto policies to allow SHA-1 verification, but we need to be First
> and Secure here as well.
>

Did we check to make sure such a change won't break Fedora's *own* GPG
keys and the GPG keys of preferred third party repositories? It was a
very unpleasant surprise to have all of CentOS' *second-party* keys
break with that change.



-- 
真実はいつも一つ!/ Always, there's only one truth!
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