Need advice on NET_ADMIN capability on a binary (iotop-c)

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Hello,

I have got a pull request [1] that implements installing iotop-c with the
NET_ADMIN capability by default and I am trying to evaluate if that is OK or
not.

Currently iotop-c will only allow to be run as root. In case it is run as some
other user, it will advise to use sudo, or alternatively add the NET_ADMIN
capability to the binary:

sudo setcap 'cap_net_admin+eip' <path-to>/iotop

Obviously that will have to be redone after each update, adding some
inconvenience for admins who decide to allow that for non-root users. I have
never considered installing it suid - that would be an overkill and may
introduce security problems. I always use it as root and have never given that
too much thought, also never before did deep analyses of the consequences of
the above setcap.

Here is a brief list of the consequences of allowing non-root users to run it
by the setcap:

- - Process IO usage will be exposed [maybe OK]
- - Process list and command lines will be exposed (same as other tops) [safe]
- - Re-nicing own processes to rt/* will not work [safe]
- - Re-nicing non-own processes will not work [safe]
- - task_delayacct sysctl toggle (Ctrl-T) will not work [safe]
- - There are no other networking operations besides TASKSTATS from
NETLINK_GENERIC that would allow the unprivileged user do privileged tasks via
the higher capped binary [safe]

As a summary it seems that accepting the PR is 99% OK, but I'd prefer to get
more opinions before doing so.

With best regards,
b.

[1] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/iotop-c/pull-request/1
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