On Fri, 2021-12-03 at 22:08 +0000, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > I'm unclear about the threat model - this is an attacker who is > someone able to overwrite single files (eg. /bin/ls) but cannot turn > off the fs-verity system as a whole? > > Also if RPM can update /bin/ls then surely an attacker who can widely > compromise system files must also be able to update /bin/ls in the > same way? Once fs-verity is enabled for a given file (which, in the RPM case, happens at package installation time), it cannot be disabled, and the file becomes immutable. One can still rename() or unlink() it (and this is indeed how rpm is able to replace files when upgrading packages), but the actual contents cannot be altered. Where is this useful? For example, fs-verity can help in the scenario where an attacker has out-of-band access to the storage device (say, they pull a hard drive from a colo'd server or a sdcard from an embedded device, or they boot into a liveusb, or they access a VM image directly from a host). Let's say that happens, and the attacker changes a few blocks of /bin/ls on the device to make it run nefarious code. When you boot your system again, it would fail at exec() time because the Merkle tree wouldn't match. Let's say that instead the attacker mounts (or gains access to) your filesystem, unlinks /bin/ls and replaces it wholesale with a new copy (hence creating a new inode). The attacker doesn't have your signing key, so they can't resign the file and enable fs-verity on it (they could resign it with their own key, but unless they can then find a way to load its cert into the kernel keyring it won't do much good). To protect against this, you now have a few options: - you could use a LSM to enforce that exec() can only happen on files with valid fs-verity signatures; this would protect any binary - you could use a launcher booted from secure storage (say, a dm-verity volume, which could even be the initrd), and have this launcher perform the verification; this of course only protects against binaries executed from the launcher, but depending on your threat model it might be enough Like most security solutions, this isn’t a silver bullet and it’s not something that in and of itself would necessarily prevent all possible attacks. However, fs-verity can be a useful building block in a defense-in-depth approach against specific attacks, depending on your threat model. Cheers Davide _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure
