crypto-policies and a certain usage of SHA-1

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Hello, I have a question for someone with deep knowledge about
cryptology. The question regards Fedora's crypto policies and a certain
usage of SHA-1 in TLS.

I encountered a web server that Seamonkey and Firefox refuse to talk
to. Both give me the error SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM.

In an attempt to find out more, I checked the server with Qualys' SSL
Server Test (https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/). Qualys gave it an A+,
which is supposed to mean that its security is excellent.

Next I used Wireshark to inspect the TLS handshake. Wireshark reported
usage of SHA-1, not in the certificate but in a signature associated
with elliptic curve parameters:

| TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Key Exchange
|     Content Type: Handshake (22)
|     Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
|     Length: 333
|     Handshake Protocol: Server Key Exchange
|         Handshake Type: Server Key Exchange (12)
|         Length: 329
|         EC Diffie-Hellman Server Params
|             Curve Type: named_curve (0x03)
|             Named Curve: secp256r1 (0x0017)
|             Pubkey Length: 65
|             Pubkey: 041f840f40a2178f875274097092ca2549138f8a7bd52df895ea413b742d1714a6cf873e…
|             Signature Algorithm: rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201)
|                 Signature Hash Algorithm Hash: SHA1 (2)
|                 Signature Hash Algorithm Signature: RSA (1)
|             Signature Length: 256
|             Signature: 09147d81aa601dc402e62cf7f943196c89822a0c8bbe07d8443654519b0e04f51b0b8e72…

To check whether this was the problem, I temporarily added "SHA1" to
/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/nss.config. This made the error go away,
and the browser happily loaded the page.

My question is: Is it true that this usage of SHA-1 makes the TLS
session weak, so that it's correct to forbid it in the crypto policy?
Or could it be that Qualys is right? Perhaps SHA-1 is fine for this use
case, even though it's too weak for other use cases, and the crypto
policy should allow it?

The website where I saw this is https://www.euroclear.com/ in case
anyone wants to test things themself.

Björn Persson

Attachment: pgp4wXEPeYnSW.pgp
Description: OpenPGP digital signatur

_______________________________________________
devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/
List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[Index of Archives]     [Fedora Announce]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Kernel]     [Fedora Testing]     [Fedora Formulas]     [Fedora PHP Devel]     [Kernel Development]     [Fedora Legacy]     [Fedora Maintainers]     [Fedora Desktop]     [PAM]     [Red Hat Development]     [Gimp]     [Yosemite News]

  Powered by Linux