Re: Fedora 34 Change: Signed RPM Contents (late System-Wide Change)

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* Colin Walters:

> I think the Change authors here trying to make it easier to enable IMA
> without the really awful hack of "boot up your installed system and
> run these shell scripts to sign", which is a laudable goal.  Having
> pre-signed OS binaries would definitely help, but...in any kind of
> general case users are going to want to run code *not* from the
> distribution, so the tooling and docs need to generalize to user-owned
> keys.

That would also help to address the GPLv3 concern I have (which does not
affect Fedora as a distribution, but could impact hardware vendors such
as Lenovo).

Does IMA support multiple keys for one file system tree?

> Also there's the inverse problem in that a lot of people will want to
> use IMA as a form of "application whitelisting" but there's...a lot of
> RPMs in Fedora.  Less of a concern for RHEL at least.

Well, yes, but it will be very easy to get a file/path combination
signed with the official Fedora key: Any packager will be able to obtain
a properly signed /bin/bash that does something nefarious and will be
accepted by any system that trusts the default Fedora IMA signing key.

I haven't checked whether the signatures actually cover the file path
and file attributes.  I guess hard links will be quite tough, but
without path-based restrictions, it will be too easy to replace a
production script with an signed insecure script that happens to reside
under /usr/share/doc.

> Anyways again I think a much more flexible user story is:
>
> "As a Fedora IoT user I want to provide a key to use for IMA
> signatures of the operating system (rpm-ostree) (and potentially
> container images, etc.) and have the first-boot process handle IMA
> signing for me and automatically apply this across upgrades too."
>
> The key would e.g. be stored in a TPM on device.

That's an interesting idea.

Given that the signature sizes are much worse than what I projected
using minimum (256 bit security level) assumptions, infrastructure for
creating the signatures on the target, without storing it in the RPM
database, seems to be rather desirable.

Thanks,
Florian
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