Re: Fedora 32 System-Wide Change proposal: Disallow Empty Password By Default

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On Thursday, December 5, 2019 5:35:09 AM MST Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Do, 05.12.19 04:30, John M. Harris Jr (johnmh@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote:
> > Well, you are, in that the average attacker have to break or steal a key
> > to decrypt the drive first. Sure, it wouldn't stop a sophisticated
> > attack.
> 
> 
> Not how this works.

It is. If you cannot decrypt it, you cannot modify it, nor even read it.

> > This is not generally true either. Encrypting /boot helps to ensure that
> > /boot is not modified, and is generally paired with GRUB signature
> > validation. In some setups, this GRUB configuration is moved to flash
> > storage.
> 
> 
> You are conflating integrity and confidentiality. If you want to
> protect boot loaders against modification you want the former, not
> necessarily the latter.

I am not conflating the two, though confidentiality inherently provides a 
certain degree of integrity. If you want to protect boot loaders against 
modification, you want *both*.

-- 
John M. Harris, Jr.
Splentity

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