Re: crypto-policies not very useful, FUTURE too strict?

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Mon, 2016-12-19 at 11:07 +0100, Tomasz Torcz wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 19, 2016 at 09:35:09AM +0100, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
> wrote:
> > On Sat, 2016-12-17 at 16:19 +0100, Tomasz Torcz wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > > 
> > >   Since few release we have nifty, consolidated way to select
> > > system-
> > > wide crypto
> > > policy. It's great, but granularity of selection is little
> > > lacking. 
> > > We have
> > > basically two sensible choices:
> > > - DEFAULT, which is, well, default
> > 
> > That is one of the main goals of crypto policies. To set a sensible
> > default across the system applications, irrespective of which back-
> > end
> > library it uses. It should not be underestimated, as even now we
> > are
> > not there yet, especially with the applications depending on the
> > less
> > known tls libraries, or applications using libssh*.
> > 
> > As a general goal, the intention of the FUTURE policy is not to be
> > compatible with the rest of the internet. That's the goal of the
> > DEFAULT policy. The FUTURE is intended to be compatible with
> > servers
> > using parameters which are considered secure.
>   So, what exactly is the use case behind this preference?

Administrators which need to set their system on a specific security
level. Future is defined to be on the 112-bit level.

regards,
Nikos
_______________________________________________
devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx




[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[Index of Archives]     [Fedora Announce]     [Fedora Kernel]     [Fedora Testing]     [Fedora Formulas]     [Fedora PHP Devel]     [Kernel Development]     [Fedora Legacy]     [Fedora Maintainers]     [Fedora Desktop]     [PAM]     [Red Hat Development]     [Gimp]     [Yosemite News]
  Powered by Linux