Re: CVE-2016-8655, systemd, and Fedora

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On Tue, 13.12.16 15:02, Przemek Klosowski (przemek.klosowski@xxxxxxxx) wrote:

> On 12/13/2016 02:51 PM, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> > Yeah, this is really what it boils down to: the goal with the systemd
> > directives is to make things easy to grok and easy to change. I can
> > probably explain to most Linux admins who have administered a current
> > Fedora in 5min what ProtectSystem=strict and
> > ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/myservice does, and why it's a good thing. And
> 
> One thing that SELinux does right is auditing---access violations are
> logged, so that there are no silent mysterious failures (well, mumble,
> mumble, maybe sometimes, you know what I mean). Also, SELinux allows
> debugging in the permissive mode that just logs without actually blocking
> access. What happens after systemd directives result in denials?

There's no auditing hook-up with systemd's sandboxing options.

The precise error your service gets depends on the sandboxing setting:
ProtectSystem=strict makes file systems read-only for a service, and
hence will result in EROFS if it tries to access something.

The seccomp-based settings by default result in EPERM.

> BTW, it's ProtectSystem=true/false/full (not strict), right?

ProtectSystem=strict is a v232 addition (→ rawhide). It's stricter
than "full" even...

Lennart

-- 
Lennart Poettering, Red Hat
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