Checking signatures on package source tarballs

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Michael, you make a very good point at 
https://blogs.gnome.org/mcatanzaro/2016/03/13/do-you-trust-this-package/

Our packaging guidelines really ought to mandate that *if* upstream
publishes GPG or PKCS#7/CMS signatures of source tarballs, then the
package *must* verify those signatures as part of %prep.

Do you want to put a draft together for approval by the packaging
committee? 

It might be nice to provide some RPM macros to make that easier for
packagers. 

I've had a go at doing this for OpenConnect, in
http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/rpms/openconnect.git/commit/?id=ca61de3f77

It's a bit pointless there, since the tarballs tend to get uploaded to
Fedora from the same workstation I sign them on, sometimes *before*
they're uploaded to the FTP site. But it's still good practice, as you
rightly point out.

-- 
David Woodhouse                            Open Source Technology Centre
David.Woodhouse@xxxxxxxxx                              Intel Corporation

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