Re: More prominent link to verification hashes

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For what it is worth, not signing the key is bug 1043276:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1043276

> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2016 19:47:51 +0000
> From: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@xxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: More prominent link to verification hashes
> To: Development discussions related to Fedora
> 	<devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAAS2fgSKZkOQQY=dW4-bSLQR66enwMXHBPv5SASg6sBkmCeVzA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 7:42 PM, Kevin Fenzi <kevin@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> My point was that you can get the signatures off the key from the
>> keyserver and see if any of them are someone you trust. If not, are
>> they connected to someone you trust (hey, look, web of trust). I think
>> expanding the web of trust on the signatories of the keys would help
>> more than just trying to distribute the key fingerprint "lots of
>> places".
> 
> They key itself should come with signatures. That it doesn't is weird
> and inconvenient. If it came with a single signature by a long lived
> key used for the purpose of authenticating keys, it would go a log
> way.
> 



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