Re: -fstack-protector-strong vs -fstack-protector-all

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On 12/15/2015 12:18 PM, Antonio Trande wrote:

> Since i started to rebuild my packages for hardened builds issue, I
> discovered (until now) a couple of libraries that result without
> "Canary protection" according to output of 'checksec' tool.

checksec is very unreliable, unfortunately.  Most of its checks can err
in both directions.

> 1) From point of view of packaging, is it acceptable a forcing of
> -fstack-protector-all?

It has a performance impact (a few percent).  In general, it is bad
practice to override RPM_OPT_FLAGS.

> 2) Does -fstack-protector-all permit a real protection where
> -fstack-protector-strong does not?

These cases are GCC bugs.  They do happen.  Here is an example:

  https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=68680

But you should not have to worry about this; all you need to make sure
is that all C/C++ sources are compiled with -fstack-protector-strong.

Florian
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