On Thu, 2015-07-02 at 16:38 +0200, Reindl Harald wrote: > this type of attitude? > > everybody who reads IT news over the past years about CA's issued > certificates even for Google knows that a CA signed certificate does > not > prove anything - the real problem is wehn this happens for Google > somebody takes notice and the press writes about it > > if the same happens for your domain nobody will recognize it The situation is going to be getting a lot better in the near future, though. We're getting to the point where we can start enforcing Google's certificate transparency: if your certificate isn't on the public audit list, we can simply reject it. That allows individual web sites to get an immediate heads-up whenever any fraudulent certificate is issued for their site. (And researchers will be looking after the most important sites, of course.) That's not going to fix TLS in itself, because most sites probably don't care, but if the site does care, it will be impossible to issue a browser-trusted certificate for the site without that site knowing. (At least, that's my understanding of the technology; I haven't researched it thoroughly.) You're right that OCSP is worthless. GNOME applications don't currently perform any certificate revocation; I'm not willing to implement OCSP unless Firefox is willing to enforce it, and they aren't. We should implement OneCRL, which solves the revocation problem for intermediate certificates, but there doesn't seem to be any reasonable solution for individual sites yet. OCSP must-staple seems promising. Of course, we can't have any of these nice features in GNOME unless somebody wants to pay for their implementation. (If so, get in touch please.) Michael -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
